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assistance.1.  Introduction
The  design  and implementation  of macroeconomic  policies  requires,  among
other  things,  a clear  understanding  of the rules  of  macroeconomic  behavior  and
the  budget  constraints  that relate  macro  variables. The development  of
empirical  macroeconomic  models  incorporating  an adequate  representation  of
such  relationships  may  be a  useful  tool  for  policy-makers  and  scholars
interested  in  macroeconomic  policy. In the  past fifteen  years,  empirical
macro  modelling  has  suffered  two lines  of  criticism:  on the  one hand,
traditional  macroeconometric  models  have  been  criticized  on the grounds  that
their  theoretical  underpinnings  are  weak and  because  of their  lack  of solid
rmicrofoundations.  A second  line  of criticism  focuses  on the fact  that  the
"structural"  parameters  of econometric  models  are in fact  not policy-invariant
and  therefore  their  use  may lead  to potentially  misleading  model-based  policy
prescriptions  and  evaluation. This  paper  takes  the  view that in spite  of the
validity  of some  of these  ctiticisms,  there  is still  room for  theoretically-
grounded,  empirically  relevant,  macroeconomic  modelling.
Hacro  modelling  may be very  useful  in  three  respects. First,  it
provides  a conceptual  framework  organized  around  accounting  identities  and
behavioral  relationships  that  can  help in the  uno'erstanding  of  macroeconomic
problems. Second,  empirical  macro  models  provide  a  quantitative  tool for
assessing  the  orders  of magnitude  of the impact  of different  policies  on the
main  variables  that  are  of interest  in  the  conduct  of  macroeconomic  policy.
And third,  the  models  can  help assess  the  consistency  between  targets  of  macro
policy  such  as low  inflation,  external  balance  and sustainable  growth,  the
setting  of policy  instruments  for  monetary,  fiscal  and exchange  rate  policy
and  the level  of certain  key  relative  prices  such  as the real  exchange  rate,
the  real interest  rate and  the  real  wage.
In this  paper  we set  up a  macroeconomic  model  for  an open economy  in
wnich  both aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  play a role in the
determination  of the  key  macroeconomic  variables  --  output,  employment  the
rate  of inflation,  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real interest  rate.  The
model is  estimated  with annual  data for  the  Chilean  economy  and  used for  the2
simulation  of  macro  policies  in the  1990s.
The analytical  model  considers  the gooda  market,  the labor  market,  and
assets  markets.  Goods  market  clearing  determines  the  real  exchange  rate.  Among
the  components  of goods  demand,  private  consumption  anu investment  as well as
exports  and  imports  are  endogenously  determined. Aggregate  demand  depends  on
current  end permanent  income,  the  real interest  rate  and fiscal  parameters;
and  on the real  exchange  rate  and  foreign  demand. Aggregate  supply  of
domestic  goods  depends  on real  wages  and  also  on the real  exchange  rate,  due
to the  use of imported  intermediate  inputs  in the  production  process.
In turn,  the 'Labor  market  need  not  clear  in the  short  run,  due  to  wage
inertia. The  wage-exchange  rate-price  mechanism  is also  an important  part of
the  model.  In particular,  our  framework  intends  te capture  the  impact  of wage
indexation  and exchange  rate  rules  on the  dy,.amics  --  and,  especially  the
inertia  --  of inflation.
Finally,  the  model  ensures  consistency  by explicitly  incorporating  three
crucial  constraints  for  the  conduct  of  macroeconomic  policy:  the  fiscal
constraint,  the balance  of payments,  and  the  money supply  identity.
The  plan of the  paper  is as follows. Section  2 provides  an overview  of
the  Chilean  economy  in the 19808  in order  to set  the stage  for  understanding
some  macro  policy  choices  envisaged  for  the 1990s. The analytical  structure
of the  model is presented  in section  3.  The results  of the  econometric
estimation  are presented  in section  4.  In section  5 the  model is  used to  :
perform  a set  of policy  simulations  for  the  period  1990-1995. A base
simulation  is constructed  in order  to have  a benchmark  case  to  which compare
the  policy  simulations. The paper  closes  with some  final  remarks  in
section  6.
2.  The Chilean  Economy  in the  1980s:  An Overview'
The behavior  of the  Chilean  economy  during  the  eightias  can  be
characterized  by three  clearly  distinguished  periods. The first  one  was
This section  draws  from  Solimano  (1990a).3
associated  with an exchange  rate  based  stabilization  program  following  the
fixing  of the  exahange  rate  from  mid-1979  to  mid-1982. In that  period
inflation  sta-ilization  was  pursued  through  the  management  of exchange  rate
policy,  and  an unsustainable  debt-led  boom in  economic  activity  developed,
fueled  by external  borrowing. A second  period  comes  in 1982-1983  where  a
severe  recession  and  a financial  crisis  set  in associated  with previous  policy
mistakes  and advertse  external  shocks. Finally,  after  1984  emerges  a  period  of
recovery  and  growth  based  in strong  export  performance  and the  recovery  of
investment  in a context  of  macroeconomic  stability,  impaired  at the  end of the
1980s  by an  unwarranted  demand  expansion.
2.1  Exchange  rate  based  stabilization:  1979  82
This  period  is characterized  b- a failed  attempt  at exchange  rate-based
stabilization  that  begins  ir-  June 1979  when,  after  a  moderate  stepwise
devaluation,  the exchange  rate  was fixed  for  an undetermined  period  of time in
order  to  curb inflationary  expectations  and  bring  domestic  Inflation  to
international  levels. The absence  of fiscal  imbalances  and  a low (and
uniform)  tariff  structure  were regarded  as atrong  backers  of the  exchange  rate
policy. Ultimately,  the  experiment  had to be abandoned  in June 198g  Len  the
exchange  rate  was finally  devalued  in the  midst  of a severe  recession  and
worsened  extern  1 conditions.
This  period  was one  of booming  economic  activity,  rising  real  wages  and  ;
overexpanding  financial  intermediation  in a context  of heavy  foreign
borrowing. Severe  misalignments  in some  key  relative  prices  and  foreign  and
domestic  overindebtedness  rendered  the  economy  particularly  vulnerable  to
adverse  external  and internal  shocks. In fact  the  real exchange  rate
appreciated  and  unsustainable  current  accounts  deficits  developed  --  up to
14.52  of GDP in 1981  --  as exports  started  to be squeezed  and imports  boomed.
In turn,  high domestic  real  interest  rates,  mainly  in 1981,  seeded  an incoming
financial  crisis  as the  path of internal  debt  accumulation  by domestic  firms  -
and  households  with the financial  system  (the  counterpart  of  heavy foreign4
borroW.ng)  reached  unsustainable  levels.
2.2  The  crisie  of 1982-83
During  1982-1983, the  Chilean  economy  experienced  a severo  recession  as
a consequence  of negative  external  shocks  and  previous  domestic  policy
miGtak,s 2. After an  attempt  to correct  the large  external  imbalance  developed
in 1981,  through  tight  money  and  high real  interest  rates (without  devaluing
the  exchange  rate),  by mid-1982  the  government  changed  its  policy  and  decided
to correct  the  exchangie  rate  overvaluation  by a series  of 1iscrete
devaluations  followed  by a  crawling  peg.  Fiscal  and  monetary  policies  were
clearly  restrictive  to support  the  exchange  rate  policy  and  reduce  domestic
absorption. As a result  of these  policies  and  the  external  shocks,  CDP fell
by around  1. percent  in 1982-83,  imports  were cut  by half in real terms  in
those  two  years,  investment  collapsed  and  open  unemployment  rates  climbed  to
nearly  20 percent. The sharp  drop  in economic  act  vity during  1982-83  was
complicated  by the  financial  situation  of  many indebted  firms  as  they  started
to face  the  coa4unction  of large  debts  and  depressed  demand. As a result,  the
financial  sector  was in a  very fragile  shape  with an important  part of the
loans  of the  major  financial  institutions  becoming  non-performing.  The
banking  crisis  further  curtailed  the  supply  of domestic  credit  in the  economy,
forcing  ultimately  the  Central  Bank to intervene  several  firnncial
institutions  and  undertake  massive  rescue  operations  and, in some  cases,
liquidation.
2.3  The  opriod  of recovery  and  growth  after 1984
A phase  of recovery  and  growth  takes  place  after  1984.  In 1984-89  GDP
grew at an impressive  6.3  per  year,  and  inflation  averaged  20.4  percent  per
annum,  a low  level  for  Latin  American  standards. In addition,  such  growth  bqs
taken  place in the  context  of reduced  reliance  on external  savings  (see  the
2  There  is an already  vast literature  on that  period  for  the  Chilean  case,
see  Arellano  (1988),  Corbo (1985),  Edwards  and  Edwards  (1987),  Foxley  (1982).reduction  In  the  current  account  deficits  in  Taole  1)  and  consolidation  of
Internal  financial  stability.  Looking  at this  porformance  some  important
questions  arises  First,  what  ate  the  sources  of  growth  in  the  Chilean  economy
in  this  period?  Is .he  current  growth  record  sustainable  over  time?  What6
Table  1. Macroeconomic  Indicators  for  Chile:  1980-89
GDP  Inflation  Fiscal  Current  Real  Real  Terms  of  Average  Real growth  rate  Deficit 1 Account  Exchange  Interest  TradA  Real  Minimum (2)  (2)  Z of GDP  Deficit  Rate  rate (Z)  (1980=100)  WaLes  Wages
(S)  (1980=100) (90-365
da s8)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6  (7)  (8)  (9)
1980  7.8  31.2  -3.1  7.1  100.0  8.4  100.0  100.0  100.0
1981  5.5  9.5  -1.7  14.5  90.9  13.2  84.3  108.9  115.7
1982  -14.1  20.7  2.3  9.5  108.8  12.1  80.4  108.6  117.2
1983  -0.7  23.1  3.8  5.7  135.6  7.7  87.5  97.1  94.2
1984  6.3  23.0  4.0  10.7  144.1  8.4  83.2  97.2  80.7
1985  2.4  7 .4  6.3  8.3  179.4  8.2  78.5  93.5  76.4
1986  5.7  17.4  2.8  6.5  175.5  4.1  79.0  95.1  73.6
1987  5.7  21.5  0.1  4.3  170.8  4.2  83.0  94.?  69.1
1988  7.4  12.7  1.7  0.8  181.9  4.6  100.0  101.0  73.4
1989  10.0  21.1  -3.0  3.0  177.5  6.8  105.0  102.9  79.7
Source: Boletin  Mensual  Banco  Central  de Chile. Various  Issues.
CEPAL  (1989) Informe  Preliminar  de  la Economia  de  America  Latina,  el Caribe. Naciones  Unidas.
"  minus  indicates  surplus.7
explains  the  fact  that thb  recovery  of economic  activity  in  Chile  has been
non-inflationatl.(by  Latin  American  standards)  in  circumstances  that  the
exchange  rate  has depreciated  over 45  percent.  in real terms,  in the  last  six
years  and  a  financial  crisis  led  monetary  authorities  to reshuffle  major
financial  intermediaries?  To  which  extent  the  benefits  from  higher  growth  have
been  shared  by labor  and  other  low  income  groups?
2.3.1  Sources  of recovery  and  growth  after  1984
An important  fact  that  table  2 shows  is that  the recovery  in  Chile  since
1984  has  been  driven  mostly  by exports  and  investment,  rather  than  by
consumption  growth. In fact,  the  average  rate  of growth  of total  exports  has
been 8.9  percent  per  year in the  period  1984-89  whereas  the  rate of growth  of
aggregate  consumption  has  averaged  4.2  per  year  over the  same  period.
Investment  has  been growing  at an average  rate  of 25 percent  per  year chough
with large  fluctuations  over  the  period;  nevertheless,  this  percentage  is
strongly  affected  by 1984  and 1989,  when the  growth  in gross  investment  seems
to reflect,  to a  considerable  extent,  the  building  up of inventories. Anyway,
as a  share  of GDP, investment  has  recovered  from  a low  of 13.6%  in 1984  to 22
percent  in 1989. Moreover,  exports  also  have increased  their  share  of  GDP
while  the share  of total  consumption  hab declined.
What explairs  the  rapid  increase  in exports,  investment  and  growth  in
the  last  six  years?  exchange  rate  policy  has played  a  preeminent  role in the
expansion  of exports  and import  competing  activities  in that  period. A higher
and  relrtively  stable  real exchange  rate  has  increased  the  profitability  of8
Table  2.  Sources  of growth  in  Chile:  1984-89
Consumdtion  Investment _Ex  wrts  inorts  GDP
rate  of  share  rate  of  share  rate  of  share  rate  of  share  Groth
growth  of GDP  growth  of GDP  growth  of GDP  growth  of GDP
(Z)  (M)  (S)  (Z)  (2)  (X)  (2)  (X)  (Z)
1984  1.3  87.4  75.4  13.6  6.8  24.3  16.5  25.3  6.3
1985  -1.0  83.5  -6.7  13.7  6.9  29.1  -11.1  26.3  2.4
1986  3.8  81.6  14.3  14.6  9.8  30.6  9.6  26.8  5.7
1987  3.8  79.0  25.8  16.9  8.8  33.5  17.1  29.4  7.7
1988  9.0  75.8  8.5  17.0  6.1  37.4  12.1  30.2  7.4
198Y'  8.1  77.0  32.6  22.0  14.8  29.0  26.3  28.0  10.0
Source: The  World  Bank
- estimate9
producing  for  external  markets  - a  factor  captured  mainly  by non-copper
exports. Thn increase  in the  basic  tariff  rate'  from 10  percent  to  20
percent  (whose  anti-export  bias  was  more than  offset  by the  real depreciation)
and  indirest  tax  reimbuisement  for  export@  have  also  contr,.buted  to the
expansion  of the tradab,.a  goods  sector  in general. In addition,  the  existence
of  idle  capacity  (until  1987)  and  the  ample  availability  of labor  also
contributed  to the  expaniton  of export  and  import  competing  activities.
Besides  the  positive  impact  of supportive  macroeconomic  policies  and  a
competitive  real exchange  rate  on the  very rapid  expansion  of non-traditional
exports  in Chile (fresh  fruit,  fish,  paper.  timber)  this  process  is  also
related  to institutional  factors  and structural  change  carried  out in  the
sixtics  and seventies. The  CORFO (Croporaci6n  de Fomento  de la Producci6i.,
plan of fruit  growing  (1968)  and the  afforestation  activities  of 1966-73  wera
two  initiatives  that  boosted  agricultural  development  and  also the  ability  to
export  in these  arrRas.  The agrarian  reform  of 1965-73  also  contributed,  in
spite  of transitional  problems,  to help  modernize  the  agricultural  sector  from
the  latifundior  (quasi-feudal)  str  cture. MoreovBr,  after  1974  a new  process
of land  redistribution,  sale  b- tender  and  auctioning  --  starting  from  the
structure  left  after  the  agrarian  reform  process  --  took  place.  giving  rise to
a  more aczive  land  market  that  was needed  to support  a  more oowpetitive
environment  in agriculture.'
Total  investment  has  been stimulated  by  various  factors5. Besides  the
recovery  of public  investment,  the  reduction  in real  interest  rates
undoubtedly  contributed  to the  recovery  of private  investment. A monetary
policy  of real interest  rate targets,  conducted  in the  context  of a financial
market  characterized  by the  extensive  use  of indexed  financial  instruments.
'  Specific  import  duties  were imposed  on some products  where evJ.dence  of
dumping  was  found.
'  See  ECLA (1990)  for  a further  discussion  of these  issues  for  the  case  of
Chile.
s  An econometric  analysis  of the behavior  of private  investment  in Chile
during  the  eighties  is  carried  out  in Solimano  (1989).10
was the  chief  mechanism  behind  the  interest  rate  policy.6 Tax incentives
seem  to  have played  also  an important  role  in the  recovery  of private
investment  in Chile,  as the  tax  rate  on corporate  incomes  was reduced  from 46
percent  to 10  percent;  in addition,  reinvested  profits  received  a preferential
tax  treatment  over  dividends.
The  average  rate  of growth  of GDP in the  Chilean  economy was  8.7
percent  during  1988-89  (10  percent  in 1989). That ixceedingly  high growth
record  seems  to reflect,  to a considerable  extent,  two  elements:  the first  is
related  to an improvement  in external  conditions  in the form  of high  copper
prices  (a  positive  terms  of trade  shock)  observed  since  1987,  and  the  second
is a political  business-cycle  feature,  namely  the adoption  of a highly
expansionary  monetary  policy  in the  second  half  of 1988  --  Ml grew  nearly  50
percent  in that  period  --  as a plebiscite  over  the  permanence  of the  military
regime  was to take  place  in October  of that  year.  In  addition,  given  the
traditional  lags in the  effects  of monetary  policy  on real  economic  activity,
the stlmulative  effects  of the  late  1988  monetary  expansion  were largely  felt
also in 1989. Moreover,  the  presidential  and  parliamentary  election  of
December  1969  was preceded  by a rather  lax  monetary  stance  that rapidly
resulted  in an acceleration  of inflation  in the  last  quarter  of 1989.
Therefore  an attempt  to  maintain  a pace  of growth  thai.  reflects,  to a large
extent,  cyclical  elements,  over  a  more extended  period  of time.  would sooner
or later  conflict  with other  targets  of  macroeconomic  policy  like  muintaining
low inflation  and  the  preservation  of external  balance. In that  perspective,
since  December  1989  the  central  bank is tightening  monetary  policy  in order  to
cool down  growth.  The actual  deceleration  in growth  during  1990  has  been
sharp  and  the forecasts  for  1990  predict  a rate  of GDP  growth  of around  1-22
for  the  year (down  from 102  in 1989).
6  According  to Fontaine  (1988).  the level  of the real interest  rate  was
determined  on the basis  of two criteria:  to provide  a reel  return  to domestic
financial  assets  competitive  with  the  return  of  financial  instruments  abroad,  so
to  avoid  capital  flight  and,  second,  the  real  interest  rate  should  be consistent
with a real  cost of credit  that  does  not  hamper  the  recovery  of investment.11
2.3.2  Whv the  adjustment  of relative  prices  and  the financial  crisis  was
non-inflationary  in  Chile?
An interesting  issue  mentioned  before  is the  non-inflationary  adjustment
of the  Chilean  economy,  in spite  of  a large  real  depreciation  of the  exchange
rate  -nearly  45 percent  since  1984 (see  table  1)  --  and the  turnaround  of a
serious  financial  crisis  that  required  massive  Central  Bank intervention.
Two explanations  may  be advanced  in this regard.r First,  the  series  of
devaluations  starting  in 1982  were accompanied  by de-indexatio.,  of wages;  thus
a real  depreciation  did  not require  a permanent  acceleration  in inflation  in
order  to reduce  real  wages.  In addition,  the  increase  in the  rate  of
unemployment,  reaching  levels  over  20 percent  in 1982-83  and remaining  fairly
high  until 1987,  acted  as a "labor  market-deterrent"  for  workers  attempting  to
recover  the level  of real  wages squeezed  after  the  crisis  of 1982. With ample
slack  in the labor  market.  firms  were not forced  to bid  up for  additional
labor  through  higher  wages (mainly  for  less  skilled  labor,  where unemployment
concentrated)  a factor  that  prevented  an acceleration  of inflation  coming  from
the  wage side  during  the  adjustment  process. Clearly  in  Chile  the "classical"
price-wage-exchange  rate spiral  resulting  from  an attempt  to  modify  the  reil
exchange  rate  while  maintaining wage indexation  and  monetary  accommodation
was absent. However  the  "Chilean  way"  was not  costless  in  terms  of economic
activity  and  real  wages,  though  the  costs  were tilted  towards  the first  phase
of the  adjustment  process.
A second  factor  refers  to the  fiscal  situation. In  Chile.  like in
other  highly  indebted  countries,  the strain  on the  public  sector  accounts
resulting  from  the crises  of 1982-83  centered  mainly (but  not  only)  on the
quasi-fiscal  deficit  (central  bank  budget). The  deterioration  stemmed  both
from  the increase  in the  domestic  currency  value  of servicing  the  external
debt  after 1982.  and  of the reecue  program  of troubled  financial  institutions
and  conglomerates  set-up  by the  Central  Bank.  These  adverse  quasi-fiscal
shocks  have  been non inflationary  for  two  main reasons: first  the  non-
7 Sea  Corbo  and  Solimano  (1990)  for  an  econometric  analysis  of inflation  and
stabilization  in Chile  during  the  last  two  decades.12
financial  public  sector  in  Chile  ran  a surplus  In its  primary  deficit  during
this  period.  transferring  part  of it to the  central  bank  to cover  its  new
losses. Second,  the  rescue  operations  of troubled  financial  institutions  were
carried  out  by issuing  interest  bearing  liabilities  of the  central  bank
rather  than  by issuing  high  powered  money. The issuing  of interest-bearing
liabilities  by the  Central  lank  was directed  to finance  debt-relief  schemes
for  borrowers  of the  banking  system,  to the  purchase  of risky  loans  by the
Central  Bank  with a (generous)  repurchase  obligation  on the  part  oi banks'
shareholders  and  to the recapitalization  and subsequent  sale (financed  with
government  credit  and  subsidies)  of intervened  banks  to small  investors  (the
"capitalismo  popular"  scheme)'. It is  notevorthy  to recognize  that  the  whole
scheme  of reshuffling  the  banking  system  involvod  placing  large  amounts  of
central  bank bonds  in the  market. That required,  of course,  a corresponding
increase  in demand  for  such  assets. The rapid  recovery  of the  Chilean  economy
since  1984  in terms  of growth  of output,  certainly  was instrumental  in that
regard  (also  because  it  helped  increase  private  savings). In a medium-term
perspective,  however,  these  new  Central  Bank interest-bearing  liabilities
constitute  a "latent  inflationary  pressure"  that  can  be triggered  if  other
"non-monetary"  sources  of central  bank revenues  deteriorate  in the future.
2.3.3  Incidence  of the  costs  of adiustment  and  the  benefits  of recovery
and  growth
A key and  difficult  question  is the  social  distribution  of the  costs  and
benefits  of the  macroeconomic  adjustment. Table  2 shows  that  average  real
wages recovered  their  1980s  level  just  in 1988  and that  minimum  wages in real
terms  were still  20 percentage  points  below  their  1980  level  and  35 points
under  their  1982  level. That  suggests  that  labor,  and  particularly  low  wage
groups,  paid a  significant  share  of the  costs  of adjustment  in  Chile.  In
turn,  the  benefits  for  labor  of the  recovery  after 1984  have taken  more the
form  of an employment  increase  rather  than  real  wage  growth. The step  from
'  See  Larrain  (1989)  for  a  detailed  account  of  the  management  of the  Chilean
financial  crises.13
functional  to personal  income  distribution  is hard  to make,  particularly  in
the  case  of Chile  because  of the  absence  of comprehensive  information  on
income  distribution  in  this  period. However,  actions  like  the cut  in some
items  of social  spending  e.g.,  pension  payments,  and  the  squeeze  on  public
sector  wages suggest  that  middle-low  income  groups  also suffered  in the
adjustment  process. The incidence  of the  costs  of adjustment  on high income
groups  is less  clear  since  their  income  tax  rates  were reduced. Asset
transfers  in the  privatizations  that  took  place  after 1985  and  the granting  of
subsidies  to the financial  sector  provide  some  clues  that  high-income  groups
were shielded,  in  part,  from the  costs  of adjustment.
3.  The  Analytical  Model
In this section  we set  up a simple  aggregate  model  for the  Chilean
economy.  We basically  use  an open economy  IS-LM  framework,  extended  to
incorporate  the  supply  side  and the  labor  market.  We consider  one  single
domestic  good'  that  can  be used for  consumption,  investment,  and  exports,  and
whose  market  must clear  at every  instant;  goods  market  equilibrium  determines
the  real  exchange  rate  and real  output.  In contrast.  the  labor  market  need not
clear  in the short  run  due  to  wage rigidity.
The presentation  of the  model  will start  with the  components  of
aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  for  domestic  goods. Then  we will turn
to the labor  and  assets  markets,  and  provide  a simplified  representation  of
the  behavioral  model.  We close  the  discussion  with the  budget  constraints  of
the economic  actors.
The Goods  Market
Let  us turn first  to the  demand  side  of the  goods  market. Aggregate
demand  for  domestic  goods  is the  sum  of public  and  private  consumption  and
'  This  may  seem  odd in  view  of the  important  role  of  copper  in  the  Chilean
economy.  The  model  assumes  that  copper  is  produced  only  for  exports,  and  that  the
production  volume  is exogenous.  Sowever,  copper  revenues  will be endogenously
daterained  by  prices  and exchange  rates (see  below).14
investment.  plus  net  exports.
The  private  consumption  equation  is based  on the  assumption  that there
are two  groups  of consumers:  the first  group  is liquidity  constrained  (they
cannot  borrow  in capital  markets  against  their  future  income),  so that  their
consumption  depends  on current  real  disnosable  income' 0, Yd. The  other
consumers  (e.g.  the  wealthy,  and  upper-middle  income  groups)  are
unconstrained,  and  determine  their  consumption  according  to the  life  cycle-
permanent  income  hypothesis  (Hall,  1978);  thus.,  their  current  consumption
depends  on past consumption  and  on the  unanticipated  change  to  permanent
income,  which  can  be summarized  also  by current  disposable  income. Aggregate
consumption  Cp,  is the  sum of consumption  of the  constrained  and unconstrained
consumers;  hence  it depends  on both current  income  and lagged  consumption:"
(1)  Cp. - Cp,(Yd,  CP.-J
Real disposable  income  is  defined  as:
(2)  Yd - [pY  - T - e*FFP]/pe
where  Y  is real  output,  p is the  domestic  price  level,  T are taxes,  e is the
nominal  exchange  rate (units  of domestic  currency  per  unit of foreign
exchange),  p,  is the  consumption  ieflator,  and  FFP is  net factor  payments
abroad  (in  foreign  zurrency  terms).  which  are  given  by profit  remittances  PR
plus interest  payments  on net foreign  debt:
(3)  FFP  - PR  +  i^-(FD-RE)
with PD and  RE denoting  foreign  debt  and  foreign  reserves,  respectively.
10  For  recent  evidence  that  the  role  of  liquidity  constraints  in  consumption
is  more  important  in  countries  with  relatively  less  developed  capital  markets  (as
most LDCs),  see  Jappelli  and  Pagano  (1990).
11 We have omitted,  just for simplicity,  two  possible  extensions:  first,
the  distribution  of income  between  wage earners  and profit  recipients  could  be
another  determinant  of  consumption  spending  (Diaz-Alejandro,  1965).  Second,  the
ex-ante  real  interest  rate  could  also  affect  private  consumption  --  although  the
direction  of this effect  is theoretically  (and  empirically)  ambiguous.  In our
empirical  work we  could  not identify  either  of these  two  effects.15
Private  fixed  investment  is determined  along  the lines  of the  standard
cost-of-adjustment  model (Hayashi.  1982).  Thus,  investment  depends  on Tobin's
Q, the  ratio  of the  market  value  of installed  capital  to its  replacement  cost.
However,  because  of  market  imperfections,  firms  may find  themselves  rationed
in financial  and/or  goods  marketsg  hence,  we must also allow  for  a direct
effect  of current  profits  and  demand  conditions' 2 on investment.  Demaad
conditions  are  measured  by the  degree  of capacity  utilization  in the  economy
Y/Yp,  where  Yp denotes  potential  or full-capacity  output.  In turn,  with
variable  production  inputs  (labor  and  materials)  optimally  adjusted,  current
profits  can  be shown  to depend  only  on the  degree  of capacity  utilization.  In
summary,  private  investment  can  be expresSedQd
(4)  Ipr  - Ip,  (Q.  Y/Yp)
In turn,  Tobin's  Q depends  on anticipated  profits  and  the  real interest
rate",  r.  As before,  profits  are summarized  by the  degree  of capacity
utilization,  Y/Yp:
(5)  Q = q(r,  Y/Yp)
Government  consumption,  C 6, and  public  investment,  I.,  are  considered
policy  determined  variables  so they  are  exogenously  given.
Real  copper  exports  X.w  are  exogenous;  in turn,  non-copper  exports  X;
are  endogenously  determined. They  depend  on the  price  of competing  foreign
goods  relative  to the  price  of the  domestic  good  ep*/p,  and  on the  level  of
12  For  a formal  proof  that  when  the  firm  faces  sales  constraints  the  optimal
investment  rule  depends  on  both  Tobin's  Q and  goods  demand,  see  Precious  (1985).
"3  For notational simplicity,  all behavioral  equations are written as
static.  However,  in their empirical  implementation  we will allow  for dynamic
effects.
" More precisely,  Tobin's  Q can be shown  to equal the  present  value of
future unit profits, discounted at  the  real rate of  interest plus the
depreciation  rate of capital, (r+5).  Under static  expectations,  this equals
current  profits  divided  by  r+S.  In  turn,  with  profits  described  by  the  degree  of
capacity  utilization  (as  argued  above).  Tobin's  Q can  be expressed  as in (5).16
world  demand  Y:
(6)  X.  X  (Sp,/P.  Y')
Real imports  depend  on the  tariff-inclusive  relative  price  of
importables  in terms  of domestic  goods,  ep (l+t)/p.  where  p' is the  world
price  of importable.,  and  on the level  of output  Y:
(7)  M - m(ep.(l+t)/p.  Y)
Equating  output  to aggregate  demand,  we have:
(8)  Y  m Cpr +  C 6 + Ipr  +  Is  + Astk  +  X¢o  +  X  - M
where  Astk  denotes  inventory  investment,  which  is exogenously  determined.
On the supply  side,  we assume  that  output  is  produced  according  to a
constant  returns  to scale  technology  that  uses labor,  capital  and  imported
materials. Assuming  profit  maximization,  we can  write the  supply  function  as
(9)  Y/Yp - ye(w/p,  ep*./p.  p)
where  w is the  nominal  wage rate,  p' 3 is the  foreign-currency  price  of
imported  materials",  and  p  is a  productivity  parameter.  Solving  for  p.  we
can  write  the inverse  supply  function  as
(9')  p - p(w.  ep"*,  p. Y/Yp)
which expresses  the  price  of domestic  goods  p as a  (variable)  markup  over  unit
variable  costs,  with the  markup  rate  increasing  with the  degree  of capacity
utilization  Y/Yp".  Moreover,  equation  (9')  must be homogeneous  of degree  one
in input  prices.
Finally,  the  change  in the  level  of capacity  output  is  related  to the
I  Here we are assuming,  only for notational  simplicity,  that the  world
price  of foreign  materials  in terms  other  importables  is constant.
14  Notice  that in principle  this  markup  specification  would be consistent
with either  perfect  or impertect  competition  in the  goods  market.17
path  of the  capital  stock:
(10)  &Yp/Yp  - AK/K
and  the  capital  stock  changes  over  time  according  to net investment:' 7
(11)  AK - (Ip,+Is)  - 6K
The  Labor  Market
Because  of  wage stickiness,  the  labor  market  need not  clear  in the  short
run.  Labor  supply  equals  the  labor  force  L; actual  employment  is always
determined  by labor  demand.  The specification  of the latter  follows  from
profit  maximization;  hence,  labor  demand  is related  to the  real  wage  w/p and
the level  of output  Y:
(12)  L - 1( w/p.  Y)
The  rate of unemployment  is defined  as
(13)  u =  1  - L/L
The labor  market  is completed  with an equation  describing  the  rate  of
change  of the average  nominal  wage  w. The latter  depends  on four  factors.
First,  the  rate of change  of the  consumer  price index  Apj/p 0, reflecting
inflationary  expectations  and/or  the  existence  of  wage indexation.  Second,  the
rate  of change  of the  minimum  wage Awmin/vmin,  which  affects  the  average  wage
directly  through  a "composition  effect"  (since  a fraction  of the  workers  earns
the  minimum  wage)  and also  through  an indirect  "relative  wage"  effect,  which
links  the  whole structure  of  wages  to the  minimum  wage.  Third,  the  degree  of
slack  or excess  supply  in the  labor  market  measured  by the  rate  of
unemployment  u, along  the lines  of a Phillips  curve  specification.  Finally,
wage growth  depends  also  on labor  productivity  g,,. Formally.
17  Here we are  making the simplifying  assumption  that public  and private
investment  are  equally  'efficient'  in increasing  productive  capacity.18
(14)  Aw/w  - v(Ap./p,  Awmin/wmin,  u,  )
The  Money  Market
We use  a  very simplified  representation  of assets  markets.  There  are
three  assets  in the  economy:  money,  domestic  interest-bearing  assets  o,  and  a
foreign  bond;  the  latter  two  assets  are imperfect  substitutes.  Moreover,  we
assume  that there  are  barriers  to capital  mobility;  hence,  the  private  sector
cannot  adjust  instantaneously  its  holdings  of foreign  assets"'.  In addition,
we assume  that the  nominal  exchange  rate  is fixed  (or  managed  by the
authorities).
We can  su-arize portfolio  equilibrium  by considering  the  money  market.
Formally,  real  money demand  h depends  on the  nominal  interest  rate i, the
level  of output  Y, and the  foreipn  interest  rate,  i-.  adjusted  by the  expected
rate  of devaluation  of the  exchange  rate,  Alne.  Hence  money  demand  is
(15)  h - h(i,  Y, is  +  Alne')
Letting  H denote  the  nominal  money  stock,  money  market  equilibrium  implies
(16)  H/P =  h(i,  Y, iC  + Alne)
or, solving  for  the  domestic  nominal  interest  rate,
(16')  i  i(  H/p,  Y,  i  + Alne')
In turn,  the  domestic  real  interest  rate r is equal  to the  difference
between  the  nominal  interest  rate  i and  the  anticipated  inflation  rate  We:
17)  r  - i  - w
IS  The  domestic  asset  implicitly  includes  public  debt  and  the  claims  on the
capital  stock  -- i.e.,  holdings  of  equity.  This  amounts  to  assuming  that  domestic
debt  and  equity  are  perfect  substitutes  (up  to a constant  risk  premium).
19  This  assumption ensures that at every instant the money stock is
predetermined; however, we  could  eliminate  it  without  any  analytical
complication.  Also,  we  could  allow  explicitly  for  a  parallel  foreign  exchange
market  without  major  difficulties  (other  than  empirical).19
Price  Defipitions
The  model is  completed  with two  equations  describing  the  consumption  and
investment  deflators.  Both  consumption  and investment  are  assumed  a composite
of domestic  goods  and imports.  Hence  their  implicit  deflators  can  be expressed
(18)  P  a  Pc(P.  eep'  (1+t))
(19)  Pk  P  Pk(P'  e9p*.(1+t))
where  Pk  iS the investment  deflatorl  further,  both p,  and  pk  must  be
homogeneous  of degree  one in  p and  eop (l+t).
Finally,  the  national  accounts  nominal  income-expenditure  identity  can
be  written
(20) pY  - p,e(Cpr+Cg)  +  pK*(Ip,+It)  +  p,st,Astk  +  e*(p*4OeXCOP+p*X.-p%M)
where  p* 0op  is the  world  price  of copper,  which is  exogenously  given;  equation
(20)  is  used to determine  the  deflator  of inventory  investment  P.tk*
A SimRle  GraDhical  Regresentation  of the  Model
We can  provide  a  simple  graphical  representation  of the  model  by
reducing  it to three  equations  depicting  aggregate  supply,  aggregate  demand,
and  the current  account  balance,  all in terms  of the real  exchange  rate,  real
output,  and  for  given  values  of the remaining  variables. First,  a semi-  p  ;
reduced  form  for  aggregate  demand  AD can  be obtained  by replacing  equations
(1)  through  (7),  (16'),  and (17)  through  (19),  into (8):
(21)  AD - AD(ep-/p,  H/ep-,  a4)
where  ad  *  (Cs,  IB,  TD,  t,  (FD-RE]/p*,  PR/p',  Y,  i*,  Alne*,  p*/p**,  X0 op,  P*Op/p*,
ir,  Cp-1),  and  in  arriving  at  (21)  we  have  used  the  fact  that  H/p
(H/ (ep*))  (ep*/p).
Letting  e1 *  ep*/p  denote  the  real  exchange  rate,  and for  given  ad  and20
given  real  money stock  in terms  of foreign  goods  H/(ep*) 20, the  AD schedule  is
depicted  in  Figure  1 as an upward  sloping  l  ne in  the  real exchange  rate-real
output  space (et.  Y), reflecting  the  assumption  that  a real  depreciation  of
the  exchange  rate  raises  aggregate  demand  --  that  is,  the  positive  effect  of a
real  depreciation  on net  exports  dominates  its  negative  effect  on real
disposable  income  and  consumption.  which is due  to the  increase  in the  value
in terms  of domestic  goods  of foreign  debt  servicing  payments,  and in the
decrease  in the  value  in terms  of consumption  goods  of a given  disposable
income  in terms  of domestic  goods 21.
The  position  of the  AD schedule  is determined  by the  values  of the real
money  stock  H/(ep')  and  the  other  variables  included  in  ad  (i.e.,  all the
variables  other  than  e 3 that  affect  aggregate  demand)  22
In turn,  the  aggregate  supply  schedule  AS is just  given  by (9).
rewritten  here as
(22)  AS =  AS(ep*/p,  w/(ep-),  a.)
where  a,  a  {(,  Yp,  p' 3/p'),  and  we have  used the fact  that  w/p
(ep'/p)(w/(ep')).  Thus,  for  givo.r  a.  and  given  real  wage in terms  of foreign
goods,  the  aggregate  supply  schedule  is  downward  sloping  in  Figure  1,
reflecting  the  fact  that  a real  depreciation  increases  the  relative  price  of
imported  materials  (as  well as the  product  wage  w/p for  given  w/(ep*))  c.ad
20  Here  we are  making  the  important  assumption  that  anticipated  inflation
and depreciation  are  predetermined.
21  In Solimano (1986)  a macro model of a devaluation  is set up and
parameterized  with Chilean  data.  The main result  ie that a real depreciation
turns out to be contractionary  in the short run followed  by an expansion  in
output  and  employment  in the  medium  to long  run.  A real  depreciation  may  affect
adversely  absorption  also  via  a  cut  in investment  due  to  higher  cost  of imported
capital or because of a reduced  access to credit by firms overindebted  in
dollars.  See Serven  and Solimano  (1990'  for  a  full  review  of the  effects  of a
real depreciation  on investment.
22  Note also  that the  inclusion  of lagged  consumption  in ad  gives  rise to
a distinction  between  short run and long run equilibrium. The short run  AD
schedule  will be shifting  over time as the economy  approaches  a stationary
equilibrium.  In our  empirical  model  this  is  more  so,  as  other  lagged  endogenous
variables  (e.g.,  exports  or the  real  exchange  rate)  would  also  be  included  among
the  determinants  of aggregate  demand.21
thus  reduces  output  supply.  A step  beyond  would  be to insert  the  laws  of
motion  of the  nominal  wage and the  capital  stock (equations  (11)  through  (14))
in (22).  bringing  out the  dynamics  of  aggregate  supply  --  and  allowing  for  a
distinction  between  the  short  run  and  long  run  aggregate  supply  schedules.
Finally,  the  current  account  deficit  measured  in terms  of domestic  goods
CA is given  by
(23)  CA - (e/p)  i* (FD-RE)  +  PR - FTR +  p.OM  - p.p&-  pPX,¢]
where  FTR are  net  foreign  transfers;  the term  (e/p)@(p  M - p 40 cX 00p  - p*XJR  is
the  resource  deficit.  Inserting  equations  (6)  and  (7)  in  (23)  we  get:
(24)  CA = CA(Y,  ep'/p,  iL,  (FD-RE]/p*,  FTR/p-.  X,.,  YV.  P-*/P*.  P*-/P*)
= CA(Y, ep*/p.  a..)
Setting  the  right-hand  side  of (24)  equal  to zero,  we obtain  the  CA
locus  in  Figure  1.  which  represents  the  combinations  of output  and  the  real
exchange  rate that  yield  a balanced  current  account  for  given  values  of all
the  other  variables.  The  locus  slopes  upward,  due  to the fact  that an
expansion  in  output  raises  imports  and  hence  the  resource  deficit,  and  must be
compensated  with a real  depreciation  in  order  to  maintain  the current  account
in equilibrium. Points  above  the  CA locus  correspond  to current  account
surplus;  points  below  correspond  to current  account  deficit.
The domestic  goods  market  clears  when aggregate  supply  and demand  are
equal;  in  Figure  1,  this  happens  at point  E. In the  figure  we have assumed
that  E also corresponds  to a  balanced  current  account;  hence,  at E the  economy
is in full  macro  equilibrium:  the  levels  of the  real exchange  rate and  output
are  consistent  with both internal  balance 2" (aggregate  demand  = aggregate
supply)  and  external  balance  (equilibrium  in  the  current  account).
Of  course,  the  meaning  of "internal  and  external  balance"  in our
2  A  related  issue  is  that  of  the  stability  of  internal  equilibrium.  A
sufficient  condition  for  static  stability  is  that  the  aggregate  demand  schedule
be upward sloping, as assumed here.  The  dynamic stability under rational
expectations  of a  model similar  (but  somewhat  simpler)  to ours is examined  in
Serven  (1991).22
framework  must  be qualified:  on the  one  hand,  internal  balance  may occur  with
unemployment  in the short  run.  On the  other  hand,  external  balance  may be
consistent  with a sustainable  deficit  in  the  current  account,  and  not
necessarily  with a zero  deficit.
Tne functioning  of the  model  can  be seen  by performing  a simple
comparative  static  exercise,  such  as an increase  in  public  spending  that
shifts  down  and to the  right  the  aggregate  demand  schedule  in Fig,-re  l(a)
(dotted  line). The  new short  term  equilibri  m would  be at  E' where the  real
exchange  rate  appreciates  and  the level  of output  increases  (assuming  output
is  below  full  capacity). At E',  however,  there  is now  a deficit  in the
current  account  which  has to be financed  either  through  an increase  in
external  borrowing  and/or  running  down international  reserves.
Another  exercise  of interest  is a devaluation  (i.e.,  an increase  in e).
Of course,  if a  nominal  devaluation  is to have  an impact  on real  variables,  it
must not be accommodated  by proportionate  increases  in  nominal  wages and  the
nominal  money  stock;  otherwise,  as  is  clear  from (21)  and (22),  real  variables
would  be completely  unaffected,  while  p. v and  H  would  all rise in the  same
proportion  as the  nominal  exchange  rate.
In Figure  l(b),  we depict  the  effects  of a devaluation  holding  constant
the  nominal  money stock  and  the  nominal  wage.  From (21)  and (22)  it is  clear
that  both  the real  money  stock  and  the  real  wage in terms  of foreign  goods
must fall,  and thus  the  AS and  AD schedules  shift  upwards;  the  CA schedule  is
unaffected.  Hence  the  outcome  is a real  depreciation  and a current  account
surplus;  however,  the  effect  on real  output  is  in principle  uncertain,
although  if the  adverse  impact  on interest  rates  and  hence  on investment
demand  is  not too  large,  output  should  be expected  to rise,  as represented  in
E' in the figure.
Let us consider  the  determination  of the  rate  of inflation  by looking  at
the  dynamics  of aggregate  demand  and aggregate  supply. This is  useful  for
addressing  ptoblems  of inflation  stabilization  and to examine  the inflationary
effects  of  wage indexation  and  exchange  rate  rules  and  money  growth,  and  in23
particular  the issue  of inflati.L  inertia.
We can .1lvstrate  these  iss:iis  as follows.  First,  equating  aggregate
demand  with aggregate  supply.
AD(  ep*/p,  H/(ep*)  9  ad)  - AS(  ep'/p.  w/(ep*),  a,)
and  solving  for  the  rate  of change  of the  price  level  n,  we have
(25)  -- a  (Aw/w)  + b (Ae/e)  +  c (QH/H)  + v
where  a+b+c.1,  v is a function  of the  rates  of change  of a,  and ad, and
foreign  prices  have  been assumed  constant. For given  v, the  rate  of inflation
is a  weighted  average  of the  rate  of  wage inflation,  the  rate of devaluation
and the  rate  of cnange  in  the  money  supply;  in turn,  inflation  may rise  or
fall  due to the  effects  of supply  and  demand  shocks  (the  v term).
We can  use (25)  to illustrate  the  effects  of the  wage formation  process
and  exchange  rate rules  on inflation.  Assuming  a  linear  functional  form  for
the  rate  of change  in nominal  wages  we can  write  equation  (14)  as:
(26)  Aw/w  - (1-9)OWC  + Bs(Awmin/wmin)  - 7*u  0  c a  c l
where  ¢r  is the  rate  of  change  of  the  consumption  deflator;  y>OS  and  for
simplicity  we  have  ignored  productivity  growth.  Hence  the  rate  of  change  in
average  nominal  wages  is  a  function  of  consumer  inflation.  the  rate  of  change
in  minimum  wages,  and  the  rate  of  unemployment.  Let  us  assume  that  the  minimum
wage  is  indexed  to  current  and  past  inflations
(27)  Awmin/wmin  - (1-9)rw  + Ow,,_1  + k  0  <  a  1
where  k  is  an  exogenous  minimum  wage  shock.  Replacing  (27)  in  (26).  we  can
write
(26')  Aw/w - Sk=  3k-  59(ir 0 - 7c..y)  u
which implies  that,  given  k, the  real consumption  wage can  only  be reduced  by
accelerating  inflation  (as  long  as 8>O)  or through  unemployment.  On the  other
hand,  from (18)  we can  write  w,  - Ax + (1-A)(Ae/e),  where OAcl  is the  share24
of domestic  goods  in  the  consumption  basket.  Finally.  let  us assume  that  money
growth  and  nominal  depreciation  partially  accomiodate  inflation;  hence  Ae/e  -
,. and  AH/H  ft where  O04,0cI.  With all  these  ingredients,  we can rewrite
(25)  as
(28)  w '  - - 'u +  vI
where  a  *  D-'a890A+(1-A)9],  7'U D-'7,  v'u  D-l(v+k),  and  D a 1-bq-c'y-a(l-
89)(A+(1-A),X]>0.  Equation  (28)  shows  that inflation  depends  on three  factors:
lagged  inflation,  unemployment,  and  exogenous  supply,  demand,  and  minimum  wage
shocks. In  particular,  the  degree  of inflation  inertia  is  measured  by a.
Hence,  as  can  be directly  verified,  the  larger  the  weight  of  minimum  wages in
average  wages  E. the  larger  their  backward  indexation  9, and  the  more
accommodating  money  and  exchange  rates  are (i.e..  the larger  0 and q).  the
more persistent  inflation  is.  In particular,  with full  accommodation  (.-4=1),
(28)  reduces  to
(28')  - - w  - (a&90)Y^u  +  (aBO)-'(v+Bk)
so that  current  inflation  fully  reflects  past inflation,  irrespective  of the
degree  of backward  indexation  9;  however,  the  larger  0, the  more costly  in
terms  of unemployment  it is  to reduce  inflation  below  its  past level.
Budget  Constraings
The  behavioral  model is  completed  with the  budgetary  identities  of the
different  economic  actors  - that is.  the  private,  public,  and  external
sector. These  ensure  the  consistency  between  stocks  and  flows  in the  model.
which is  necessary  for  the  simulations  to be of any  practical  interest.
One important  issue  is the  appropriate  degree  of disaggregation  of the
public  sector.  Normally,  for  the  purposes  of  macroeconomic  analysis,  it  would
suffice  to consider  the  consolidated  financial  and  nonfinancial  public  sector
--  that  is, including  the  Central  Bank.  However,  in the  Chilean  case  the
recently  introduced  autonomy  of the  Central  Bank creates  some  unusual  fiscal25
problems,  due  to the  large  stock  of Central  Bank debt to the  private  sector,
and  to an equally  large  stock  of foreign-currency  denominated  liabilities  of
the  Government  with the  Central  Bank.  In order  to keep  close  track  of the
fiscal  implications  of these  two issues,  we choose  to consider  these  two
agents  separately.
To adapt  the  budget  identities  to the  Chilean  institutional  context,  we
must take  into  account  two  facts. First,  most domestic  currency  financial
instruments  (with  the  obvious  exception  of the  money stock)  are indexed  to the
price  level. The interest  actually  paid on such instruments  is given  by a
market  determined  'real'  interest  rate  applied  to the  actualized  (i.e.,
according  to inflation)  principal  of the  instrument.
Second,  the  way  in  which  the  nonfinancial  public  sector  (more  precisely,
the central  government)  services  its  main liability  with the  Central  Bank
(which  has the form  of a dollar-denominated  Treasury  note  held by the latter)
is somewhat  special.  The  liability  originates  from  the  consolidation  of past
transfers  to cover  the  Central  Bank's  operating  losses.  Interest  on the
Treasury  note  accrues  at a rate  equal  to LIBOR  plus a fixed  spread. However,
the actual  interest  payment  by the  government  is only  2 percent  of the
principal;  the remaining  interest  accrued  is  capitalized.  Moreover,  the
government  can  also  make anticipated  amortization  payments  to reduce  the
principal  of the  note".
Keeping  these  issues  in  mind,  we can  now  describe  the  budget  constraints
of the  model.  First,  the  identity  of the  external  sector  is just the  Balance
of Payments,  which in terms  of foreign  currency  can  be written
(29)  P *°M  - (P*07,  +  P',peX,Op)  - FTR + (PR  +  i**(FD-REj)  - DPI + A[FD-RE]
Here  DFI is direct  foreign  investment;  all  variables  (with  the  exception
of real  imports  M and  real  copper  and  non-copper  exports  XCOp  and  X.,)  are
measured  in foreign  currency  (dollar)  terms. The  left-hand  side  of the
24  For  example,  in  1990  the  government  made  an amortization  payment  of US
$  230  million.26
equation  is  the  current  account  deficit  described  before;  the right-hand  side
is the  capital  account  balance.  Again,  the term  in square  brackets  FD-RE
represents  pet  foreign  debt.
In turn,  the  budget  constraint  (in  nominal  terms)  of the  nonfinancial
public  sector  can  be  written
(30)  (p,*Cg  +  GTR1b  +  OE  +  ropO[b.  +  dc,]+  eoiO1FD,  - CSF?)
- (TD  +  TI +  OR + CUR) +  pk*I 8
n  p@(Adc,  +  abs)  +  e*AFDg  - eo(TBAmort  +  ACSF)
The first  two lines  of (30)  represent  the  public  deficit. The first  term in
brackets  represents  current  expenditures;  the  second,  current  revenues. Here
TD and  TI respectively  denote  direct  and indirect  tax  revenue  in  nominal
terms;  CUR represents  nominal  revenue  from  copper  production  (i.e.,  the  pre-
tax  operating  surplus  of the  public  copper  company);  OR and  OE are  other
current  revenues  and  expenditures 2", expressed  in  nominal  terms;  CSF is the
'Copper  Stabilization  Fund',  which  we describe  below;  and  GTR 0b  is a transfer
to the  Central  Bank.  also  expressed  in  nominal  terms,  which corresponds  to the
interest  paid on the  Treasury  note  held  by the  Bank.  Letting  TB denote  the
principal  of the  note (in  dollars),  GTRCb  is determined  according  to
(31)  GTRCb  - oOe*TB
where  a  is a given  parameter  (currently  equal  to 2  percent,  aS explained
above). In turn,  copper  revenues  are  related  to copper  prices  and exchange
rates  by the  following  equation:
(32)  CUR =  (eSP*,,  - 9P)OYS"
where a is  a cost  parameter,  and  Yd,.  denotes  the  volume  of public  copper
production. Thus,  nominal  production  costs  are assumed  to rise one  for  one
25 OR includes  basically  nontax  revenues  of  the  government  and  the  operating
*urplus  of public  enterprises  other  than  the  copper  company.  In turn,  OG  mainly
involves  transfers  and subsidies  to the  private  sector.27
with domestic  prices. 3'
The  bottom.line  of the  public  sector's  budget  constraint  reflects  the
change  in the  net liabilities  of the  nonfinancial  public  sector. Here dc,  and
ba  are  the  net domestic  credit  from the  Central  Bank 2" and  net public  debt
held  by the  private  sector,  respectively,  and  they  are  defined  in real terms;
hence,  the corresponding  interest  payment  is determined  by the  real  interest
rate  times  the  adiusted  value  of the  principal,  where  the latter  is determined
by the  price  level. In turn,  PD.  is  net foreign  debt of the  nonfinancial
public  sector.
The last two  items  in  the right-hand  side  of (30)  are  somewhat  unusual
and  deserve  separate  comment. First,  TBAmort  represents  the amortization
payment  made  by the  government  on the foreign  currency-denominated  Treasury
note held  by the  Central  Bank 2 ; its  amount  is arbitrarily  determined  by the
government. The principal  TB evolves  over  time according  to
(33)  ATB  I=*TB  - (GTRcb/e)  - TBAmort
so that if  no amortization  is  paid,  then the  change  in  the  principal  plus  the
current  transfer  received  by the  Central  Bank add  up exactly  to i'*TB,  i.e.,
the (spread-inclusive)  world interest  rate 2" times  the  principal  of the
Treasury  note.
In turn,  CSF is the 'Copper  Stabilization  Fund',  expressed  in
dollars'°.  It represents  a government  account  at the  Central  Bank to  which a
fraction  of copper  revenues  is deposited  whenever  the  copper  price  exceeds  a
26  Actually,  part of the  operating  costs  of CODELCO  correspond  to cop  er
purchases  and  thus  are  related  to  copper  prices.  For  simplicity,  we ignore  this
in (32).
2' According  to the  new  regulations  in  Chile,  the  Central  Bank  is  forbidden
from  lending  to finance  public  deficits.  Hence,  Ado,  cannot  be positive.
26 Notice  that  such  note is  not included  in dc.
29 As  described  above,  i  would  equal  LIBOR plus  a  fixed  spread.
3O  Again,  the  copper  fund  is  not  included  in  net  credit  from the  Central
Bank  dc.28
specified  upper  bound,  and  from  which  withdrawals  can  be made  when the  price
falls  below  a likewise  specified  lower  bound.  In summary.  we can  write:
(34)  ACSF - p  y
-here  0<1 (and  not necessarily  positive),  and its  precise  value  depends  on the
world  price  of copper  relative  to the  specified  upper  and lower  bounds 31.
Finally,  we have  the  Central  Bank's  budget  identity:
(35)  e9i^6(FD.b-RE)  - rep*(dc 5 + dcp,)  - GTRCb  + eoi*CSF  -
ISB  + e*A(FD¢b-RE)  - pA(dc8+dcpj)  + e*(TBAmort+ACSF)
The  top line  of the  equation  is  the  operating  loss  of the  Central  Bank,
with dcpr  denoting  real  net  credit  to the  private  sector
32; thus,  the loss
equals  the interest  paid on net foreign  liabilities  minus the interest
received  on net  domestic  assets  (excluding  the  Treasury  note),  minus the
transfer  from  the  government,  plus the  interest  paid  to the latter  on the
Copper  Fund.
The  bottom  line  again  denotes  the  change  in the  net liabilities  of the
Central  Bank  which finances  its  net  operating  loss.  It comprises  the  increase
in the  money base  HB,  and in  net foreign  indebtedness,  the  decline  in net
domestic  assets,  and  the  payments  received  from  the  governmeut  for  deposit  to
the  Copper  Fund  and  for  amortization  of the  Treasury  note3
In the  model,  the  monetary  base is  related  to the  money  stock  H by the
money  multiplier  p, which is  assumed  exogenous:
(36)  H *  IASHB
"  Alternatively,  we could  have  defined  de,  as  net  of  the  copper  fund  CSF  and
of the  Treasury  note  TB.  The approach  used  in the  text  intends  to  highlight  the
important  role  of these  two items  in the  Central  Bank-Central  Government  link.
1  Net, in particular,  of domestic  debt of the Central  Bank held by the
private  sector.  hus, in the  Chilean  case  dep,  is negative.
33  Obviously,  if  the  operating  lose  is zero  and  if there  are  no government
payments to the Copper Fund or for amortization  of the Treasury  note, the
equation  collapses  into  the  standard  money  supply  identity.29
To conclude  the  presentation  of the  budget  identities"'.  it  may be
instructive  to consider  briefly  the  budget  constraint  of the  consolidated
public  sector,  including  the  Central  Bank.  Suminig  (30),  and (35),  this  can  be
written
(36)  p¢*C.  + OE + r*polb,  - dc,lJ  +  eei**[FDS  +  PDb - RE]
- (TD  +  TI  +  OR  + CUR)  +  pkeI 8
m  poMbs  - dcp,l  + e@A(FD,  + FDb  - RE)  + AHB
where  (FD,+FDCb-RE) and  p*(b.-dcp,)  respectively  are  the  net  foreign  and
domestic  debt  of  the  overall  public  sector.  Using  the  money  market  equilibrium
condition  (16)  along  with (33).  and  after  some  well known  manipulations,  we
can rewrite  (36)  in compact  form  as
(36')  def  + rob + tr*  + (Ae,/el)]f  = Ab  + bf + (1/p)*(Ah(.)  +  *h()]
where  def  a  (poC$  +  OE - (TD  + TI  +  OR  + CUR)  +  pk-l,  I/p  is  the  primary
deficit  of the  overall  public  sector  in real  termas  b a  b.7dcpr  is the real
domestic  debt  stock;  f E  (e/p)*(FDi+FD.b-RE)  is  the  real  value  of the  net
external  debt stock  of the  public  sector  in terms  of domestic  goods;  r  a  i*-f*
is the  foreign  real interest  rate;  et  denotes  the  real  exchange  rate,  as
before;  and  h(.) is the  money  demand  function  (15).
The left-hand  side  of (36')  is the  inflation-adjusted  deficit  of the
overall  public  sector,  which includes  the real  primary  deficit  plus real
interest  payments  on domestic  and  foreign  debt;  observe  that  the real  interest
rate relevant  for  foreign  debt is the  world real iinterest  rate  plus the  rate
of depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate'  Aede 1. The adjusted  deficit  must
"  In principle,  the  model  would also  include  a budget  constraint  for  the
private  sector. However,  such  equation  can  be shown  to  be a  linear  combination
of  the  budget  constraints  of the  other  sectors  and  the  National  Accounts  income-
expenditure  identity  (20),  and  thus  it need  not  be considered  explicitly.
35 Obviously,  with  unrestricted  access  to foreign  and domestic  financial
markets, the optimal financial  strategy of the public sector would be to
diversify  its  sourc  i  of financing  only  if  r  - r'.&ee 1S. This  has  been  emphasized
by Buiter (1989).30
be financed  by increasing  the  real  stocks  of foreign  and/or  domestic  debt,  or
by seigniorage  revenues  (the  last  term  on the  right-hand  side).
In order  to ensure  that  public  debt  will not  eventually  grow  without
bound,  we must require  that  real interest  payments  on the  debt  stock  be  met by
future  primary  surpluses  and  seigniorage  revenues  (where  the  latter  include
the  increase  in real  balances  plus  the inflation  tax  revenue) 36. In terms  of
the  model,  this  can  be done  by imposing  simple  fiscal  (or  quasi-fiscal)  policy
rules,  such  as assuming  that  increases  in  debt service  are  matched  in  every
Period  by tax increases  (as  in,  e.g.,  McKibbin  and Sachs  (1990)).  While  this
can  be easily  done,  it  would  unnecessarily  limit  the  ability  of  the  model  to
explore  some  quite  realistic  scenarios  of 'sustained'  fiscal  imbalance.  A more
flexible  approach  is to allow  for  arbitrary  fiscal  imbalances  in the short  to
medium  term,  while imposing  fiscal  adjustment  in the  longer  term.
4.  Empirical  Results
4.1  Preliminary  Issues
The structural  model summarized  in the  previous  section  consists  of
eleven  estimable  equations:  four  for  the  components  of aggregate  demand
(private  consumption,  private  investment,  imports,  and  non-copper  exports),
three  goods  prices  relationships  (the  inverse  supply  schedule,  and the
consumption  and  investment  deflators),  two labor  market  equations  (for
employment  and  nominal  wages),  and  two  asset  markets  relationships  (for
Tobin's  q and the  domestic  interest  rate).
36  Formally, integrating  (35")  under the assumption  that debt does not
explode  in  the  ong  run,  we can  write  the  intertemporai  budget  constraint  of the
public  sector  as
b(t)  +  f(t)
Go
f  exp{-R(s))@((^h(s)+ir(s)*h(s))/~  - def(s)]  ds +  f  exp(R(s)-R*(s)}*f(s)  ds
t  t
s  5
where  R(s) a  I  r(v)  dv,  R  (s)  a  I  (r(v)+Ase(v)/et(v)]  dv.  That is,  the  existing
t  t
debt  stock  must equal  the  present  discounted  value  of future  primary  surpluses
plus ssigniorage  revenues, plus an additional term that adjusts for the
discrepancy  between domestic and foreign (real depreciation-adjusted)  real
interest  rates.31
As  written  above,  the  behavioral  equations (with  the  only  exception  of
that for  private.consumption)  contain  no dynamics.  However,  in reality  we must
allow  for the  slow  adjustment  of the left-hand  side  variables  to their
'target'  levels.  For  example,  decision  and  delivery  lags in the  case  of
investment,  or slow  market  penetration  in the  case  of exports,  can account  for
substantial  differences  between  the  short-  and long-run  responses  of
investment  or exports  to their  determinants.  Thus,  in  our empirical  equations
we included  lags  of the  dependent  and/or  independent  variables  to capture  this
lagged  adjustment  effects.  In  most cases,  a standard  cost-of-adjustment  model
proved  sufficient.
In  principle,  efficient  estimates  of the  model's  parameters  could  be
obtained  from  a joint  estimation  technique  (e.g.,  three-stage  least  squares  or
full information  maximum  likelihood). However,  the  available  sample  (which
includes  fewer  than 30 data  points)  is 'undersized',  as the  sample  size falls
short  of the total  number  of predetermined  variables  in the  model.  In such
context,  the  maximum  likelihood  estimator  is  not  well defined  (Sargan  (1975)),
nor is the  3SLS  estimator  (as  the  instrument  matrix  fails  to have  full  column
rank). Alternative  system  estimators  based  on instrumental  variables  have
been  proposed  in the literature  (see  e.g.,  Swamy (1980));  each one  of them
results  from a particular  set  of restrictions  on the  set  of instruments
employed  in the  estimation,  and  therefore  can  be interpreted  as imposing
implicit  (and  arbitrary)  restrictions  on the  model's  reduced  form  parameters
(for  a discussion,  again  see  Swamy (1980)). However,  the  relative  advantages
of the  alternative  estimators  are  not  entirely  clear,  as the  comparisons  of
performance  often  rely  on asymptotic  arguments  which  by definition  are  of
little  interest  in the  context  of small  samples. Finally,  the  computation  of
some  of the  system  estimators  for  undersized  samples  can  be rather  cumbersome
(e.g.,  Brundy  and Jorgenson  (1971)).
On the  other  hand,  joint  estimation  techniques  pose the  well-known
problem  that  misspecification  of any  equation  will 'contaminate'  the  rest  of
the  model,  leading  to inconsistent  estimates  in all  the  equations.32
In view of these  facts,  we decided  to estimate  the  model  using  2SLS
equation  by equation,  with different  sets  of instruments  for  each equation".
In this  manner,  we avoid  the  problem  of contamination  - at the  cost of some
possible  losses  in efficiency,  which in an undersized  sample  such as  ours are
not  likely  to be of great  significance.
4.2  Estimation  Results
The  equations  of the  model  were empirically  estimated  using  annual  data
for  the  years  1960-1987.  Overall,  the  estimated  equations  provide  reasonably
good fits;  none shows  any symptoms  of serial  correlation. All the  parameter
estimates  carry  the  theoretically  correct  signs.  In  most equations  we tested
some specific  parameter  restrictions  and,  when not rejected,  imposed  them.
Such  constraints  raise  the  precision  of the  estimates  and  also contribute  to
make the simulation  results  more easily  interpretable.  In some  cases,  the
constraints  are  dictated  by basic  economic  theory  (e.g.,  behavioral  rules  for
real  variables  should  be homogeneous  of degree  zero  in all  nominal
magnitudes),  and their  rejection  would  be a symptom  of  misspecification.  In
other  cases,  they  make the  dynamics  of the  model  more reasonable  (for  example,
when imposing  a unit long-run  elasticity  of consumption  with respect  to
disposable  income).
Below  we describe  briefly  each  one  of the  empirical  equations.
Goods  Market
Private  Consumption  - As stated  in (1),  the  estimated  equation  relates
real  private  consumption  to real  disposable  income  and  to lagged  consumption;
attempts  to find  a significant  role for  the  real interest  rate,  credit
availability,  or income  distribution,  proved  unsuccessful.
The selected  equation  is:
"  A possible  extension  of this procedure  would be 3SLS with different
instruments  for  each  equation  (Schmidt  (1990)).  Of  course,  this  would  again  lead
to inconsistent  estimates  in  all  equations  if any  one  of the  model's  equations
were  misopecified.33
(37)  Log(Cpr)  - - 0.069  +  0.578 Log(Cpr(-l))
(-2.863)  (5.757)
+  0.422 Log(Yd)  - 0.194 D74
(5.757)  (-5.742)
R2 - 0.964  DW  - 2.105  h - - 0.320
Adj-Ra a  0.961  F  =  321.545
Sample:  1961-87
2SLS.  instruments a  Log(Cpr(-l)).  Log(Yd(-1)).  Trend,  D74.
The  adopted  specification  incorporates  the  constraint  of a unit log-run
elasticity  of consumption  with respect  to disposable  income;  the  constraint
was not rejected  by the  data.
The  consumption  deflator  - The implicit  price  of consumption  was assumed  in
(18)  a  weighted  average  of the  prices  of domestic  goods  and imports  (with  the
latter  adjusted  for  tariffs). We used a first-difference  specification:
(38) ALogPc  0.893  ALogP  X  0.107  ALogle*P-,(1+t))  + 0.060  d74
(26.920)  (26.920)  (2.261)
R2  - 0.9980 DW  - 2.271
Adj-R 2 - 0.9979 F  - 12004.61
Sample:  1962-87
2SLS;  instruments - ALogP(-1).  ALog[e9P",(1+t)J(-1).  Log(P%Op),  d74
The  weights  of domestic  and import  prices  are  constrained  to sum  to
unity,  and  the  regression  constant  is  restricted  to zero;  neither  constraint
was rejected  by the  data'.
Private  fixed  investment  - As described  in (4),  private  fixed  investment  is
related  to Tobin's  Q  (defined  as the stock  market  index  relative  to the
investment  deflator)  and  the  level  of output  relative  to full  capacity".
The estimated  equation  is of the  lagged  adjustment  form,  and is  written  in
" Observe  that  a  zero  constant  term  amounts  to  ruling  out  a  long-term  trend
in the relative  price  of consumption.
"'  Capacity  output  was constructed  by the  method  of interpolation  of  peaks.34
terms  of  the  (real)  share  of private  investment  in  GDP:
(39)  Log(lpr/Y)  - 1.437  +  0.124  Log(Q)  +  0.795 Log(Y/YP)
(-4.556)  (2.996)  (2.008)
+  0.372  Log(Ipr(-1)/Y)  - 0.472 D72
(2.849)  (-3.027)
Ra  0.7493  DW  - 1.723  h - 0.947
Adj-R 2 - 0.7016 F  - 15.693
Sample:  1962-87
2SLS;  instruments c  Log(Q(-1)).  Lo (  Y(-1)M  A?-1) ),  Lo (Ipr(-1)).
LogPc~,  r-2),  Trend  i  (-I) Lo4*-1)),  D72
Thus,  in the  long  run the  investment  share  rises  more than  one for  one
with the  degree  of capacity  utilization. In turn,  the  long-run  elasticity  of
investment  with respect  to Tobin's  Q  is about .2.  somewhat  smaller  than  that
obtained  by Solimano  (1989)  from the  estimation  of a similar  equation  with
quarterly  data.
The investment  deflator  - As in  the  case of consumption.  the  investment
deflator  in (19)  is  a weighted  average  of the  GDP deflator  and  the  import
deflator. A first-difference  specification  proved  adequate:
(40)  ALogPk  =  0.856 ALogP  +  0.144  ALogleP*K(1+t)]  +  0.099  d7172
(16.506)  (16.506)  (3.505)
R2 =  0.9948  DW  - 2.059
Adj-R'  - 0.9946  F  - 4581.25
Sample:  1962-87
2SLS;  instruments - ALogP(-l).  Log(eOP^"(1+t)](-1),  Log(P*,ep),  d7172
As before,  the  equation  incorporates  the  constraints  that the  shares  of
domestic  and  foreign  prices  sum  to unity  and  that  the  constant  be equal  to
zero;  both constraints  were tested  and  not rejected  by the  data.
Non-comoer  eg2orts  - Real  non-copper  exports  are assumed  in (6)  to depend  on
their  relative  price  eP*/P  - i.e.,  the  ratio  of foreign  prices  to the  GDP
deflator  -and on  world  demand  Y',  measured  by real  world imports  from35
developing  countries again  we use a lagged  adjustment  specification. The
estimated  equation  is:
(41) Log(Xnc)  - 1.492  +  0.814  Log(Xnc(-1))
(-3.245)  (12.565)
+  0.308  Log(eeP*/P)  +  0.186  Log(Y)  +  0.517  D64
(3.068)  (12.565)  (3.999)
R 2 =  0.9714  DW  - 1.983 h - 0.047
Adj-R2 n  0.9677 F  *  260.327
Samples  1961-87
2SLS;  instruments =  Log  (Xn(-1)),  Log(Y'),  Log(P*,.(-1)),
Log(e*P  /P)(-1),  i(-1), D64
The long-run  elasticity  of real  exports  with respect  to  world demand  is
constrained  to one;  the  constraint  was not  rejected  by the  data.  In
accordance  with other  studies,  our empirical  results  indicate  considerable
export  inertia. The elasticity  with respect  to the  real  exchange  rate is  only
.308  in the  short  run,  but in  the  long run  it rises  to about 1.6.
Imports  - Real imports  depend  on output  and  on their  relative  price,  described
by the import  deflator  times  one  plus  the  tariff  rate  divided  by the  GDP
deflator. Again  we used a lagged  adjustment  specification:
(42) Log(M)  =  - 2.353  +  1.004  Log(Y)  - 0.209  Log(e*P*m(1+t)/Pl
(-5.302)  (6.983)  (-4.669)
+  0.198  Log(M(-1)) +  0.185  D7781
(2.346)  (4.992)
Ra  - 0.9577  DW  - 2.008h  u  - 0.373
Adj-R' - 0.9500 F  *  124.42
Sample:  1961-87
2SLS;  Instruments - LogM(H-1)),  Log(Y(-1)),  Log(e*P'N(1+t)/P)(-1).
Log(i  - )* Log(e*PFr2/PJ(-1),  D7781
The estimated  long-rur.  el4sticity  of imports  with respect  to real  GDP  is
about 1.2. The  restrictioui  that it  be equal  to one  is not accepted  by the
data (t-statistic=2.7).  In turn,  the  long-run  relative  price  elasticity  is
about  0.25.36
A&Zregate  sugply  - As noted  above,  the  inverse  supply  schedule  (9')  can  be
viewed  as the  price  equation  of the  model,  with prices  determined  as a  markup
over  variable  cost,  which Ln  turn  consists  of  wages and  the  cost of imported
materials,  and  with the  markup  rate  allowed  to vary  with the  degree  of
capacity  utilization. The  selected  specification  imposes  homogeneity  of
degree  zero  in nominal  prices;  thus the  equation  is  written  in terms  of
relative  prices":
(43)  Log(P/W)  - 0.627  +  0.416  Log(Y(-1)/YP(-1))
(-1.059)  (1.726)
+  0.630  Log(eOPFm/P)  - 0.0214  Trend  +  1.630  ln(l+r)
(3.538)  (-5.619)  C  _
+  0.081  D6465
(2.078)
R=  0.9379  DW  2.20
Adj-R2  =  0.9192  F  =  50.30
Sample:  1961-87
instruments  Log[Y/YPJ(-1).  Log[e-PFm/PJ(-l),  Log(Ptc,p).
Trend,  ln(  1+r),  D6465
Here r denotes  the indirect  tax  rate,  whose  coefficient  was constrained
to reflect  full  pass-through  of indirect  taxes (the  constraint  was not
rejected  by the data). Notice  that  the  estimated  equation  can be rewritten
(43)'  lnP  =  ln(l+r)  +  .613  lnW  +  .387  ln(eSPFm)  + .255  ln(Y(-1)/YP(-1))  +
so that the  cost  share  of labor  is about  602,  and that  of  materials  is 401.
Our results  have  two important  implications.  First,  changes  in nominal
input  prices  are immediately  passed  on to  goods  prices,  without  any adjustment
lags.  Second,  demand  pressure  is reflected  in  prices  only after  a one-period
lag;  hence,  given  input  prices,  final  goods  prices  are  unaffected  by output
changes  in the  short  run  --  which,  as  we discuss  below,  has important
consequences  for  the  short-run  inflation-output  tradeoff.
'0  We experimented  with different  dynamic  specifications,  to  allow  for  some
inertia  in  the  adjustment  of  prices  to  nominal  production  costs;  however,  we  were
unable  to identify  any  such effect.37
The labor  market
Emoloyment  - Employment  is determined  by labor  demand,  which,  according  to
(12),  is  related  to real  output  and  to the  real  wage.  Preliminary  experiments
showed  that the  dynamics  were adequately  captured  by an error  correction
spec:.ication:
(44) ALog  L  0.184  +  0.222  ALog  Y  - 0.070  Log(L(-l)/Y(-1))
(2.584) (2.446)  (-2.343)
- 0.050  Log(W(-l)/P(-1))  - 0.075  D74-6,82-3 +  0.043  D8487
(-2.157)  (-5.287)  (4.956)
R
2 =  0.924  DW  3  2.369
Adj-R 2 0.902
Sample:  1962-87
2SLS;  instruments =  ALog  Y(-1),  Log[L(-1)/Y(-1)i,
Log(e*PFm/P)  (-1),  Log[W(-I)/P(-1)],  i*,  Dummies
The estimated  short-run  response  of employment  to output  is only -bout
.2;  however,  the  long  run elasticity  is constrained  to  unity;  the  constraint
was not  rejected  by the  data.  The long-run  real  wage elasticity  (which  can  be
interpreted  as the  elasticity  of substitution)  is about .7,  although  not
significantly  different  from  one.
Wages  - As described  earlier,  the  evolution  of average  nominal  wages is
related  to that  of consumer  prices  (summarized  by the  consumption  deflator)
and  minimum  wages,  and  to the  unemployment  rate. Attempts  to introduce  both
current  and  past inflation  along  with  minimum  wage growth  as explanatory
variables  proved  unsuccessful  due  to the  strong  collinearity  between  one-
period  lagged  inflation  and  current  minimum  wage growth  --  which  probably
reflects  the  existence  of formal  or informal  (partial)  minimum  wage indexation
to  past inflat 4.on  in some  portions  of the  sample. Faced  with the  two  options
of keeping  either  minimum  wages  or past inflation  as  regressors,  we chose  the
former  alternative,  in order  to retain  the  ability  to  explore  the  effects  of
minimum  wage policies  in the  simulation  model.38
A first-difference  specification  along  the lines  of a Phillips  curve
proved  adequate:.
(45) ALog  W a  0.088  - 0.239  U+  0.492  ALogPc  +  0.462  ALogWmin
(4.452)  (-2.051)  (3.547)  (3.418)
- 0.133  D64  - 0.417  D73  +  0.224  D76
(-3.071)  (-5.705)  (4.824)
R2  =  0.9922  DW  2.131
Adj-R 2 =  0.9898
Sample:  1963-87
2SLS;  instruments  ALog  Pc(-1),  &LogPe(-2),  AlogWmin(-1).
U(-1),  Log(e*PFm/P)(-1),  Dummies
Since  minimum  wage growth  was found  to  be strongly  dependent  on
inflation,  it is  not used  as an instrument  in the  estimationl.  One feature
of the  estimated  equation  which  is  worth  noting  is that  the  constraint  that
the  inflation  and  minimum  wage coefficients  sum  to  one is not  accepted  by the
data.  This  has the important  consequence  that  a permanent  increase  in
inflation  coupled  with a nominal  minimum  wage increase  such  the  real  minimum
wage is  unchanged,  will cause  a decline  (although  a  very small  one) in the
real  average  wage.
By excluding  lagged  inflation  from  the  estimated  wage equation,  it  may
seem  that  we are  eliminating  one  potentially  important  source  of inertia  in
the  wage-price  system. However,  what our  empirical  results  really  imply  is
that  in the sample  the  observed  wage inertia  was largely  due to inertia  in the
4  An auxiliary  regression  of minimum  wage growth on current and past
inflation  yields  the  following  results:
ALog  Wmin - -0.043 +  0.696  ALogPc  +  0.304  ALogPc(-1)
(-3.141) (13  794)  (13.794)
R 2 a  0.9792  DW  - 1.904
Adj-Ra  *  0.9775
Sample:  1963-87
2SLS;  instruments *  ALog  PJ(-1),  ALogP.(-2),  AlogWmin(-1),
U(-1),  Log(e*PFm/P)(-1),  Dummies  _39
adjustment  of the  minimum  wage to inflation.
Assets  markets
Money  market  - Asset  equilibrium  is summarized  in (16')  by an interest  rate
equation,  which can  be viewed  as the  money  market  equilibrium  condition
inverted  to solve  for  the  nominal  interest  rate. The latter  is related  to the
depreciation-adjusted  foreign  interest  rate,  the real  money stock  (measured  by
M1 divided  by the  GDP  deflator),  and  real  output. We assume  rational
expectations  and replace  anticipated  depreciation  with its  actual  value,  which
is then  treated  as  an endogenous  variable:
,0
(47)  i =  0.020  +  0.075 (i+e) - 0.578 Log(H/P)
(0.296)  (3.528)  (-4.552)
+  0.578  Log(Y)  +  1.691  D7576
(4.552)  (11.483)
R 2 =  0.9194  DW  =  1.968
Adj-R' =  0.9088 F  =  87.43
Sample:  1961-87
2SLS;  instruments  =  (i*+e)(-l),  Lop[H/PI(-l) 1 Log(Y(-.1)).  Trend,
Log(P*  Op),  Log(PO.p(-l)).  i  ,  Log(Y'),  D7576
Viewing  the  equation  as  the  money  market  equilibrium  schedule,  it can  be
seen that  we have imposed  a  unit elasticity  of real  money  demand  with respect
to output;  the  constraint  was tested  and  not  rejected  by the  data.  The
semielasticities  with respect  to the  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  are
about  1.73  and .13,  respectively;  the  latter  result  is  similar  to that found
by Edwards  (1985)  and  Edwards  and  Kahn (1986).
Tobin's  Q - As in Solimano  (1989),  Tobin's  Q is  assumed  in (5)  to depend  on
the  degree  of capacity  utilization  and  on the  ex-ante  real interest  rate.
Experiments  including  the  relative  price  of investment  goods (measured  by the
investment  deflator  relative  to the  GDP deflator)  were unsuccessful.  Also,  all
our specifications  performed  very poorly  when estimated  on the  full  sample,
probably  due to the substantial  changes  experienced  by Chilean  financial40
markets  in th3  past  two  decades. We  wyre forced  to restrict  the  estimation  to
the  post-Allende-periodg  due  to the scarcity  of degrees  of freedom,  the
results  must be viewed  aa highly  tentative.
(47)  Log(Q)  '  1.314  +  5.188 Log(Y/YP)  - lOiS  r
(14.159)  (8.957)  (-2.918)
+  0.465 D8082
(4.525)
R-  0.9608  DW  - 2.144
Adj-R 2 - 0.94397F  - 57.158
Sample:  1976-86
2SLS;  instruments  - LogjY/YP](-1),  r(-2),  Log(Pcur),  i*,
Log(Y  (-1)),  d8082
As before,  we used  the  assumption  of rational  expectations  to replace
the  ex-ante  real interest  rate  with its  ex-post  counterpart. The results
indicate  that  capacity  utilization  has  a strong  positive  effect  on Q, in
accordance  with the  results  obtained  by Solimano. We also find  a strong
adverse  effect  of the  real  u.nterest  rate.
4.3  Some implications
As we noted  above,  one feature  of our empirical  results  which is  worth
emphasizing  is the  implied  shape  of the  short-run  aggregate  supply  schedule.
This  can  be most easily  illustrated  by replacing  equationt  (44)  and (45)  into
(43),  using  the  approximation  U - (L'-L)/L'  - ln(L'/L),  and assuming  all
foreign  prices  grow at the  same  rate.  After  some  manipulations,  we obtain  the
following  semi-reduced  form  equation  for  inflation:
(48)  - - .40  AlnWmin  + .56  (alne  +  ir)  +  .09  lnY  +  Z
where w is  the domestic  inflation  rate (measured  as AlnP),  w* is the  foreign
inflation  rate (again  measured  as AlnP), and  Z is  a  linear  combination  of tax
rates  and predetermined  variables. Thus.  in the  short  run  inflation  depends
on the rate  of growth  of the  minimum  wage and  on the  rate of change  of the
prices  of foreign  goods  in domestic  currency  --  in turn  given  by the  rate  of41
nominal  depreciation  plus  the foreign  inflation  rate  --  and  also  on the  level
of economic  activity.
The important  fact  is that  the  coefficient  on lnY is  very small  --  in
other  words,  given  the  rate  of growth  of the  minimum  wage,  the  rate of nominal
depreciation,  and  world  inflation,  a reduction  in inflation  in the short  run
can only  be achieved  at the  cost  of a  sharp  recession. More precisely,  a ten
percent  decline  in real  output  leads  in the  short  run  to a decline  in
inflation  of less  than  one  percent"a.  This result  may help  understand  the
developments  in the  Chilean  economy  in 1990.  in  which a  sharp  deceleration  of
economic  activity  has  had  only limited  short-run  success  in bringing  down
inflation  from  the  high levels  that it  had achieved  as a  result  of the
increase,  in that  year,  of indirect  taxes,  minimum  wages,  and  world  oil
prices.
Naturally,  the  precise  form  of the  short-run  inflation-output  tradeoff
depends,  as we discussed  before,  on the  policy  rules  according  to  which the
minimum  wage and the  rate  of nominal  depreciation  are  determined. For
example,  if the  nominal  exchange  rate is adjusted  to keep  the  real exchange
rate  constant  (i.e..  Alne  - X  - fr).  then inflation  is  given  by:
, =  .91  AlnWmin +  .20 lnY +  k1*Z
where  k,  is a constant. This has  two interesting  implications:  first,  the
rate  of inflation  becomes  very sensitive  to changes  in the  nominal  minimum
wage. Second,  the  output  cost  of bringing  down inflation  becomes  lower,
although  it still  remains  substantial:  now  a five  percent  decline  in output  is
required  to reduce  inflation  one  percentage  point.  In other  words,  the
aggregate  supply  schedule  of thc  economy  becomes  steeper  under  the PPP  rule.
5.  Out-of-samDle  Policy  Simulations
42 It is  apparent  that  equation  (48)  allows  for  an  inflation-output  tradeoff
even in the long run, as the  coefficients  on the  nominal  minimum  wage and on
foreign  prices  fail  to sum  to  one.  This is  due  to  our  finding  of  non-neutrality
in the  nominal  wage equation  (44).42
5.1  General  Remarks
The empirical  model  was used to simulate  the  evolution  of the  Chilean
economy  under  alternative  assumptions  about  fiscal,  exchange  rate,  and  wage
policies,  as  well as  under  different  external  conditions.  The  simulation
scenarios  were chosen  to illustrate  different  aspects  of the  working  of the
model,  and  not  necessarily  because  of their  likelihood  or realism.
In all  the  simulations,  the  external  environment  is exogenously  given.
This  comprises  the  evolution  of  world  demand  Y% the  foreign  interest  rate i*,
and  the  world  prices  of imports  as well as those  of copper  and  non-copper
exports  (P*H.P*,op  and  P1.  respectively).  Real copper  exports  follow  an
exogenously  given  path.  Similarly,  profit  remittances,  net transfers  from
abroad  and  direct  foreign  investment  are  all  exogenously  projected  in foreign
currency  terms.  We also  assume  no debt conversions.  The  time  path of the
foreign  debt  stock  is  given  exogenously,  to reflect  the  limited  availability
of external  financing.  Finally,  the interest  rate on foreign  debt is assumed
to  carry  a  1  percent  spread  over  LIBOR.
Among  the  fiscal  variables,  tariff  rates  are  assumed  to remain  unchanged
throughout  the simulation  period.  In turn,  the  indirect  tax  rate also  remains
constant,  after  an initial  increase  in 1990 (see  below).  The items  'Other
government  revenues'  and 'Other  public  expenditures'  are  assumed  to remain
constant  as percentages  of GDP.  Copper  revenues  are  endogenously  determined,
as  we described  above,  although  the  volume  of public  copper  production  is
exogenous.  Real  public  investment  grows  at a constant  rate  throughout  the
simulation  period.  On the  other  hand,  the  public  sector  deficit  is assumed  to
be entirely  financed  by foreign  debt.  No amortization  on the  Treasury  note is
paid after  1990.
This leaves  as fiscal  policy  variables  real  public  consumption  and
direct  taxes.  Because  of the  flexibility  of the  simulation  model,  their  time
paths  can  be either  exogenously  given  (e.g.,  in terms  of fixed  real  growth
rates),  or related  to other  endogenous  variables  according  to  appropriate
policy  rules  (e.g..  public  consumption  can  be determined  so as to achieve  a43
prescribed  public  savings/GDP  ratio)".  Which  of these  alternatives  is
adopted  depends  on the  specific  simulation  scenario  under  study.
The same  applies  to the  remaining  policy  variables:  the  nominal  exchange
rate,  the  money stock,  and the  legal  minimum  wage.  Their  time  path can  also  be
specified  either  in the  form  of a given  rate  of growth,  or according  to a
policy  rule (e.g.,  a crawling  peg for  the  nominal  exchange  rate).
In the  monetary  accounts,  the  money  multiplier  is  assumed  constant.  Base
money growth  is specified  exogenously,  and foreign  reserves  are obtained  from
the  Balance  of Payments  (as  the  aggregate  foreign  debt stock  is  exogenously
projected).  We also assume  that the  Central  Bank's  foreign  debt  stock  remains
constant;  hence,  its  budget  identity  endogenously  determines  the  time  path  of
net credit  (or,  more accurately,  net  debt)  to the  private  sector  dcpr.
To complete  the  simulation  model,  we must  also specify  the  evolution  of
some  other  variables.  These  include  the  labor  force,  which is assumed  to grow
at a constant  rate.  and  real inventory  investment,  which is assumed  to remain
constant  as a ratio  to real  GDP  throughout  the  simulation  period.
Finally,  it is important  to note  that in the  simulations  we assume
static  expectations  for inflation  and  for  nominal  exchange  depreciation.  This
has the  advantage  of enormously  simplifying  the  solution  of the  model.  Under
rational  expectations,  it can  be shown  that in our  model  current  endogenous
variables  would depend  on the  current  and future  anticipated  values  of all
exogenous  variables;  thus the  model  would  have to  be solved  using  a 'multiple
shooting'  technique  in order  to find  the  convergent  trajectory.
The  mode.  was simulated  using  1989  as the  base  year.  This introduces
some  complications,  since 1989  was a 'boom'  year --  particularly  for
investment  and imports  (and  also  non-copper  exports).  and also in terms  of a
spectacular  increase  in the accumulation  of inventories.  The boom  could  be
43  Of course,  these  degrees  of freedom  only  exist  for  the  near  term.  In the
long run, the setting of the two variables has to satisfy the additional
constraint  of  providing  the  primary  budget  balance  required  to  avoid  an  explosive
path for  publ'.c  debt,  as  we noted  before.  Since  in  the  simulations  below  we are
only concerned  with the  short  to  medium  term,  and  since  the simulated  model is
backward-looking,  we need not concern  ourselves  with this  problem  here.44
explained  mainly  by the  stimulative  monetary  policiee  adopted  in 1988.  and
perhaps  also  by anticipations  of  possible  trade  restrictions  and/or  of real
depreciation.
To reflect  the  expected  cooldown  of the  economy  in 1990.  we introduced  a
downward  adjustment  in the  accumulation  of inventories,  which for  the
simulations  is  fixed  at  0.3  percent  of real  GDP. down  from  3.3  percent  in
1989.  This amounts  to a once-and-for-all  adverse  shock  to aggregate  demand,
which  results  in an economic  slowdown  in 1990;  however,  since  in the  empirical
model  some  of the  components  of aggregate  demand  display  substantial  inertia
(consumption,  investment,  exports).  this  may not  eliminate  completely  the
lagged  effects  of the 1989  boom.
In all  the scenarios  we assumed  some  monetary  and fiscal  adjustment  in
1990.  Direct  taxes  rise 1.5  percentage  points  of  GDP in 1990.  and  the indirect
tax  rate  rises  2 percent  in the  same  year.  Monetary  policy  is transitorily
restrictive  in those  two  years,  with  money  growth  proceeding  at a constant
rate  thereafter.  Similarly,  the  minimum  wage is increased  by 26 percent  in
1990"  .
5.2  The  simulation  scenarios
Below  we present  the  results  of five  simulation  scenarios.  The first  one
is a reference  or 'base'  scenario,  which  is  mainly  used as a benchmark  for  the
purposes  of comparison.  The second  and  third  scenarios  simulate  the  effects  of
'internal  shocks':  a fiscal  expansion,  and an increase  in  minimum  wage growth,
respectively.  Finally,  the  fourth  and  fifth  scenarios  explore  the  effects  of
two  adverse  'external  shocks':  a fall in  copper  prices,  and an increase  in oil
prices.  Although  both represent  terms-of-trade  disturbances,  the  latter
scenario adds to the  picture  the  ingredients  of a supply  shock.
(i)  The Base Scenario
"  This is the approximate  equivalent  in annual  terms to the 40 percent
increase  that took  place  in  Hay.45
The  base scenario  represents  a 'reference'  case,  and does  not
necessarily  correspond  to a 'most  likely'  scenario.  Fiscal  policy  is assumed
moderately  restrictive:  after  the  tax  adjustment  described  above,  direct  taxes
remain  constant  as a percentage  of GDP.  while  real  public  consumption  and
investment  rise  at the  constant  rates  of 1 and  4 percent  per  year,
respectively"'.
The assumed  time  path of copper  prices  deserves  some  attention.  The
world  price is  assumed  to fall  about 15  percent  in 1990,  followed  by an
additional  10  percent  fall  in 1991.  In 1992  it stays  at this  new  value,  and
thereafter  it grows  at the  assumed  rate  of  world inflation  (which  throughout
equals  5 percent).  This amounts  to a total  fall  of about  34  percent  in the
relative  price  of copper  in terms  of other  foreign  goods  over  the simulation
period,  from  the  very high levels  achieved  in 1989-90.
We also assume  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate follows  a 'crawling  peg',
to achieve  a modest  1  percent  real  depreciation  per annum.  Finally,  wage
policy  is summarized  by the rate  of change  of the  nominal  minimum  wage.  which
slows  down gradually  after  1990 (when  it equals  26 percent),  to reach  22
percent  in 1991  and  20  percent  per  annum  in 1992-95.
(ii)  Internal  shocks
Fiscal  expansion
In this scenario  we explore  the consequences  of a balanced-budget
expansion  in  public  consumption.  In 1990-92  real  public  consumption  rises  by
one  percentage  point  of GDP  per annum,  relative  to the  bass  scenario;  it then
remains  constant  as a share  of GDP.  The expansion  is entirely  financed  by a
direct  tax  increase,  so as to leave  the  public  deficit/GDP  ratio  unchanged
from  its  level  in the  base  scenario.  All  other  exogenous  variables  and  policy
rules  are  the same  as in the  base  scenario,  so that,  in particular,  the  path
of the real  exchange  rate is  unchanged  (by  appropriately  adjusting  the  nominal
" This expansion  of public  consumption  may seem too  slow at first  sight;
however, it represents  an expansionary  change  when compared  vith the recent
trend.  as public  consumption  declined  in  real  terms  in 1985-89.46
rate of depreciation).
Minimum  Wate Increase
This scenario  investigates  the  consequences  of a faster  rate  of minimum
wage growth. We raise  the  latter  to 25 percent  in 1991-95;  recall  that in the
base scenario  the  minimum  wage rose  by 22 percent  in 1991  and at a  constant
rate  of 20 percent  in 1992-95. To avoid  an excessive  increase  in inflation,
and also  to explore  the impact  of the  higher  wage growth  on the  real  exchange
rate,  we assume  the  same  nominal  depreciation  as in the  base  scenario. All
other  exogenous  variables  and  policy  rules  are identical  to those  in the  base
scenario. In particular,  it is important  to emphasize  that  the  time  path of
public  consumption  is left  unchanged,  so that  we are implicitly  assuming  that
the  wage policy  change  refers  mainly  to the  private  sector's  wage.
(iii)  External  Shocks
Fall in  copper  prices
This  scenario  is based  on more  pessimistic  assumptions  about  the
trajectory  of the  world  price  of copper. The  latter  is the  same  as in the
base  scenario  for 1990.  but in 1991  it is assumed  to fall  by 20 percent
(compared  with 10  percent  in the  base  scenario),  and  in 1992  by a further  10
percent  (it  was unchanged  in the  base  scenario). It then  stays  constant  in
1993  at this  level,  and in 1994-95  rises  at the  world rate  of inflation  (5
percent). Overall,  the  assumed  trajectory  represents  a 50  percent  decline  in
the relative  price  of copper  in  terms  of other  foreign  goods,  about  15  percent
more than in  the  base scenario.
We also  assume  that  the  adverse  effect  on  public  finances  of the  fall in
copper  revenues  is  partially  offset  by fiscal  adjustment. In  particular,
public  consumption  declines  with respect  to the  base scenario  by half  of the
loss  in copper  revenues,  so that  only  50 percent  of the  latter  is reflected  in
a fiscal  imbalance. The  remaining  exogenous  variables  and  policy  rules  are
the same  as in  the base  case.47
Oil  shock
In the final  scenario  we investigate  the  consequences  of a permanent  oil
shock. We assume  that  the  price  of oil  rises  13.3  percent46  in 1990.  and  an
additional  12  percent  in 1991;  thereafter,  it rises  at the  world  rate of
inflation. In the  long run,  this  amounts  to about  a 15  percent  increase  in
the  relative  price  of oil in terms  of other  foreign  goods.
Oil is implicitly  included  in the  model  as  part of the  composite  import
commodity  and also  in the imported  intermediate  input. Thus,  the  oil price
increase  is reflected  in an increase  in the  foreign-currency  prices  of
aggregate  imports  and  of imported  materials. The former  rises  by a percentage
determined  by the share  of oil imports  in total  imports,  times  the  oil  price
increase. The latter  rises  by the  share  of oil  in  materials  imports  times  the
oil  price increase.
Finally,  to isolate  the  macroeconomic  impact  of the  oil  price  shock,  we
assume  that  no macroeconomic  adjustment  measures  are taken;  in particular,  the
rate  of nominal  depreciation,  and the  time  paths  of the fiscal  policy
variables,  are  the same  as in the  base scenario. The remaining  exogenous
variables  and  policy  rules  are  also  unchanged.
5.3  Simulation  Results
Base  Scenario
The results  of the  base  scenario  are  summarized  in  Table  5.1.  The
combined  effect  of the  monetary  and fiscal  adjustment  measures,  along  with the
assumed  fall  in the  demand  for  inventories.  result  in a drastic  slowdown  of
the  economy  in 1990.  Real GDP  growth  falls  to 3.3  percent.  while inflation
rises  to almost  30 percent  due to the  combined  effect  of the  minimum  wage
increase,  the  accelerated  rate of nominal  depreciation  required  to  maintain
the  real exchange  rate,  and  also as  a consequence  of the 1989  boom (see
equation  (4.7)'  above). Despite  the slowdown,  the  current  account  balance
"  That is,  a  40 percent  increase  during  the  last four  months  of the  year,
which amounts  to 13.3  percent  in annual  terms.48
shows  a  substantial  deterioration,  rtly  due to the  assumed  fall in  copper
prices. The  budget  surplus  of the  nunfinancial  public  sector  also declines,
while the  inflationary  push  and the  assumed  real  depreciation  lead to a
reduction  in the  real  wage despite  the  increase  in the  minimum  wage.
After the 1990  slowdown,  there  is a recovery. This ia  due to the
combined  effect  of the inertia  of aggregate  demand  --  in  particular,  exports
and  private  investment  are still  growing  at high  rates  --.  to the absence  of
further  contractionary  tax increases,  and also  to the  sustained  real
depreciation. The  rate of growth  of real  GDP rises  to 5.8  percent  in 1991,
and then  declines  gradually  to stabilize  around  4.8  percent, while inflation
decelerates in 1991 --  due to the economic slowdown of 1990 --  and then
remains  around  17  percent. The  current  account  deficit  also  narrows,  to reach
4.3 percent  in 1995. The public  surplus  is still  falling  in 1991-92  along
with real  copper  prices,  but starts  to rise  again  when they  bottom  out; it
reaches  about  2.5  percent  of GDP in 1994-95. In turn,  the  real  wage rises  by
six  percentage  points  over the simulation  period,  despite  the  assumed  real
depreciation.
Fiscal expansion
The results  of this  simulation  can  be  more easily  understood  with the
help  of Figure  2. Assume  that  in the  base scenario  the  economy  started  from
the  situation  depicted  by point  A, at the  intersection  of the  SS and  DD
schedules;  hence,  the  CA schedule  passing  through  point  A  corresponds  to the
current  account  deficit  achieved  in the  base  scenario.  Now there  is a fiscal
expansion,  and  hence  the  DD schedule  shifts  to the  right,  to a position  such
as D'D' in the  figure.  If this  were all, then  the  result  would be at output
expansion  and a real  appreciation  relative  to the  base scenario,  together  with
a current  account  deterioration;  that  is,  we would  reach  a point  such  as B.
However,  since  we have assumed  that  nominal  depreciation  is raised  so as to
keop the  same  real  exchange  rate  path  as  In the  base scenario,  point  B cannot
be  the  final  outcome;  rather,  the  additional  depreciation  combined  with49
unchanged  minimum  wage growth  leads  to a fall  in real  wages (see  equation  (22)
above)",  that  shifts  the  supply  schedule  to S'S';  thus,  the final
equilibrium  must be achieved  at point  C,  where the  real  exchange  rate is
unchanged  at its  initial  value,  and  the  output  expansion  is further  increased
to y1.
The  numerical  results  of the  simulation  appear  in Table  5.2.  The fiscal
stimulus,  which  develops  in 1990-92,  raises  GDP  growth  in those  years  by about
1.5  percentage  points  above Its  level  in the  base  scenario;  as the fiscal
impulse  comes  to a halt in 1993-95.  the  economy  slows  down,  with growth
falling  below  its  level  in the  base  scenario;  GDP growth  eventually  stabilizes
at 4.3  percent. The additional  demand  pressure  causes  also  a transitory
inflation  increase  relative  to the  base scenario.  which disappears  in the  long
run  as real growth  slows  down.  The increased  growth  is  reflected  in the
current  account  deficit,  which  shows  a persistent  deterioration  relative  to
the  base scenario. The  external  imbalance  averages  about  7  percent  of GDP
over the  simulation  period,  and  peaks  at 7.7  percent  in 1994;  it  eventually
starts  declining  in 1995.
By construction,  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  public  deficit  remain
unchanged  at their  values  in the  base  scenario. In contrast,  the  additional
inflation  - given  the  path  of the  nominal  minimum  wage - leads  to slower  real
wage growth, so that  in 1995  the  real  wage is 1  percent  lower  than it  was in
the  base scenario.
Minimum  wage increase
The effects  of the  minimum  wage increase  are illustrated  in Figure  3.
With the given  rate  of  nominal  depreciation,  the immediate  consequence  is an
increase  in the  real  wage (see (22)  above),  that  shifts  the  SS schedule  to the
left.  The result  is  a real  appreciation,  an output  contraction,  and  a current
"  The  additional  depreciation  with  unchanged  monetary  growth  also  leads  to
a  reduction in the  real money  stock  (see (21) above), and hence  to  a
contractionary  shift  of  the  DD  schedule.  We  have  ignored  this  to  avoid  cluttering
the figure.  The  net result  etill  is a rightward  shift  of the  DD schedule.50
account deterioration relative to the base scenario.
The  numerical  results  appear  in Table  5.3.  They show a reduction  in real
GDP growth,  which  now falls  after  the  transitory  recovery  of 1991;  it
eventually  stabilizes  at 3.7  percent  in 1994-95. Inflation  shows  a parallel
increase  over its  level  in the  base scenario;  it  averages  about  18.5  percent
at the  end of the simulation  period.
The real exchange rate stays now practically unchanged from its level in
1990;  this  amounts  to a real  appreciation  of more than  6 percent  in 1995
relative  to the  base scenario  --  which is  also the  extent  of the  real  wage
increase  in 1995.  This leads  to a significant  current  account  deterioration
despite  the  growth  slowdown,  with  the  external  deficit  now  reaching  5.5
percent  of GDP in 1995,  compared  with 4.3  in  the  base  scenario.  This  is
partly  due  to a  worsening  of the  fiscal  balance,  which results  mainly  from  the
reduced  real  copper  revenues  that  follow  from  the  real appreciation;  the
fiscal  surplus  is now reduced  to 1.9  percent  of GDP  in 1995,  compared  to 2.6
percent  in the  base  scenario.
Copper  orice  fall
As in the  previous  scenarios,  we can  use  Figure  4 to illustrate  the
qualitative  consequences  of the  copper  price  fall.  The terms.of  trade
deterioration  relative  to the  base scenario  shifts  the  CA schedule  to the
left,  as now  a more depreciated  real  exchange  rate  is required  to keep the
same  current  account  deficit  as in the  base scenario.  However,  under  our
assumption  of partial  fiscal  adjustment  the  aggregate  demand  schedule  also
shifts  to the left  to DID',  reversing  part (but  not all)  of the external
accounts  deterioration  through  a fall  in output  and a real  depreciation;  this
would take  the  economy  to a  point  such  as B in the figure.  But  to this  we must
add the  reduction  in nominal  depreciation  that is  required  to keep  the real
exchange  rate  unchanged,  as assumed;  together  with the  unchanged  wage
behavior,  this  implies  a real  wage increase  that  shifts  the  SS schedule  to the51
left,  reducing  output  even further  and  preventing  the  real  depreciation' 8.
The final  equilibrium  would  be at point  C.
The  numerical  results  of ti'  simulation  are sualarized  in  Table  5.4.
The fall  in copper  prices  forces  a fiscal  retrenchment  starting  in 1991,  that
causes  a  persistent  fall  in  GDP  growth  relative  to  the  base  scenario;  the
growth  decline  averages  about  0.8  percentage  points  in  1991-95.  As  public
expenditure  is reduced,  so is the  pressure  of aggregate  demand,  and  hence
inflation  shows  a  moderate  reduction  relative  to the  reference  scenario  -
which is also  reflected  in  a  somewhat  higher  real  wage.
Since  the  fiscal  adjuetment  does  not fully  offset  the  reduction  in
copper  revenues,  the  public  surplus  declines;  by 1992,  it has  been almost
entirely  wiped out.  In 1995.  the  deterioration  in  public  finances  relative  to
the  base scenario  amounts  to almost  1  percent  of GDP.  The  current  account  also
deteriorates;  the  external  deficit  now  exceeds  7 percent  of GDP in 1991-94,
and in 1995  it is  more than  two  points  higher  than  in the  base scenario.
Oil  price  increase
The  diagrammatics  of this  scenario  are  depicted  in Figure  5. As in the
case  of the  copper  price  fall,  the  adverse  terms  of trade  shock  shifts  the  CA
schedule  up and to the  left,  to CA'CA'.  However,  the  oil  shock  is  also an
adverse  supolv  shock,  that  shifts  the  SS schedule  to the  left,  leading  to a
real appreciation,  a fall  in output,  and  a further  current  account
deterioration.  The final  equilibrium  is at a point  such  as B.
The  numerical  results  for  this  simulation  are  summarized  in Table  5.5.
The  oil shock,  which takes  place  in 1990-91,  leads  to an immediate  slowdown  in
economic  activity:  in 1990,  real  GDP  growth  falls  by about  0.5  percent
relative  to the  base scenario,  and  by one  percentage  point  in 1991-92.
Inflation  rises  in 1990-91  above  its  level  in th'%  reference  scenario,  but then
declines  due to the  economic  deceleration;  in 1995  it equals  17  percent.
'$  Symmetrically  with the fiscal  expansion  scenario,  the reduced  nominal
depreciation together with  unchanged money growth raises real balnncee,
moderating  the  contractionary  shift  of the  DD schedule.52
compared  with 17.4  in the  base  scenario.  As in the  wage increase  scenario,
higher  inflation.combined  with unchanged  nominal  depreciation  lead  initially
to a real  appreciation,  that  is later  partially  reversed. However,  in 1995
the  real  exchange  rate  has appreciated  by over  4 percent  relative  to the
reference  scenario.
As a consequence  of the terms  of trade  shock  and  of the real
appreciation,  the  current  account  suffers  a sharp  deterioration,  with the
deficit  peaking  at 6.9  percent  of GDP in 1991.  and  remaining  above  6 percent
throughout  the simulation  period. As before,  the real  appreciation  has also
the  effect  of reducing  real  copper  revenues,  and  the fiscal  surplus  declines
relative  to the  base scenario. The real  wage also  declines,  due  to the
erosion  caused  by increased  inflation  with an unchanged  minimum  wage growth,
and  to the  additional  unemployment  (relative  to the  base scenario)  generated
by the  reduction  in growth.
6.  Final  Remarks
In this  paper  we have constructed,  estimated,  and simulated  a
macroeconometric  model  for  Chile.  The  model  a'llows  for  the  interaction  of
aggregate  supply  and  demand  factors  in the  determination  of the  key
macroeconomic  variables,  such  as real  output  and employment.  inflation,  the
real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  wage.  and the  current  account  balance.  It
ensures  the  full  consistency  of the  different  macro  aggregates,  by imposing
the  relevant  budget  constraints  on the  fiscal  sector,  the  Central  Bank,  and
the  Balance  of Payments. To this  consistent  framework,  the  model  adds a set
of behavioral  equations  with sound  analytical  foundation3.Thus,  the  model
provides  a porentially  useful  tool  for  the  design  and  evaluation  of
macroeconomic  policy.
The behavioral  equations  were empirically  estimated  using  annual  data
for  Chile.  The results  are  in  general  quite  encouraging:  the  model tracks  the
observed  values  of the  endogenous  variables  with a high degree  of accuracy,
and its  qualitative  properties  are  well in lir.e  with the  predictions  of53
macroeconomic  theory.
The  model  was simulated  to explore  the  effects  on the  evolution  of the
economy  of different  internal  and  external  disturbances:  a balanced-budget
fiscal  expansion,  a policy  of increased  minimum  wage growth,  a fall in  world
copper  prices,  and an oil  price  shock. These  simulations  attempt  to
illustrate  the  effects  of domestic  policies  and external  shocks  that  shape  the
current  policy  discussion  in Chile.54
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(a)  A Fiscal  Expansion
AS
]AD
(b)  DevaluationTable  5.1
Simulation  results  1990-95: Base  Scenario
Real GDP  Inflation  Curr.  Account  Nfps  Real  Exch.  Real
Year  Growth  Rate'  Deficitb  Deficit 4 Rated  Wage*
1989'  10.0  13.3  3.0  -2.9  100.0  100.0
1990  3.3  29.6  5.3  -2.5  101.0  97.8
1991  5.8  15.3  5.5  -2.0  102.0  100.2
1992  5.6  16.4  5.4  -1.9  103.0  £01.8
1993  5.3  17.0  5.0  -2.2  104.1  103.4
1994  4.7  17.3  5.3  -2.4  105.1  105.0
1995  4.8  17.4  4.3  -2.6  106.2  106.9
Notes:  a - GDP Deflator
b - As percentage of GDP
c - Deficit  of the  non-financial  public  sector,  as percentage  of GDP
d - Increase  means depreciation
e - In terms  of  the  consumption  deflator
f - Actual valuesA  it  it
I  I
4  ~~~I  I
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Simulation  results  1990-95: Fica_l  ExVanljon
Real GDP  Inflation  Curr.  Account  Nfpe  Real  Exch.  Real
Year  Growth  Rate'  DefAEcitb  RaiA&W  R.te 4 Wage
1989'  10.0  13.3  3.0  -2.9  100.0  100.0
1990  4.7  29.8  5.7  -2.5  101.0  97.8
1991  7.5  16.9  6.6  -2.0  102.0  99.7
1992  7.1  18.4  7.3  -1.9  103.0  100.6
1993  5.3  18.7  7.2  -2.2  104.1  101.7
1994  4.3  17.6  7.7  -2.4  105.1  103.6
1995  4.3  17.3  6.9  -2.6  106.2  105.9
Notes:  a - GDP  Deflator
b  - As percentage  of GDP
c  - Deficit  of the  non-financial  public  sector,  as percentage  of GDP
d - Increase  means  depreciation
e - In terms  of the consumption  deflator
f  - Actual  values62
Figure  3
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Table  5.3
Simulation  results  1990-95: Minimum  Wa&e Increase
Real  GDP  Inflation  Curr.  Account  Nfp.  Real Exch.  Real
Year  Growth  Rate'  Deefictb  Deflcit'  Rate 4 WaIe'
1989'  10.0  13.3  3.0  -2.9  100.0  l00.0
1990  3.3  29.6  5.3  -2.5  101.0  97.8
1991  5.6  16.4  5.6  -1.9  101.1  100.8
1992  5.1  18.1  5.7  -1.6  100.6  103.4
1993  4.5  18.6  5.6  -1.7  100.2  106.1
1994  3.7  18.7  6.2  -1.8  100.0  108.9
1995  3.7  18.6  5.5  -1.9  99.9  112.0
Notes:  a - GDP Deflator
b - As percentage  of GDP
c  - Deficit  of the  non-financial  public  sector.  as percentage  of GDP d  - Increase  means  depreciation
e - In terms  of the  consumption  deflator
f  - Actual  values64
Figure  4
The  'copper  price  fail'  scenario






Simulation  results  1990-95: Cooper  Drice  fall
Real GDP  Inflation  Curr.  Account  Nfps  Real Exch.  Real
Year  Growth  Rate'  Deficitb  Deficit'  Rated  Wage'
1989,  10.0  13.3  3.0  -2.9  100.0  100.0
1990  3.3  29.6  5.3  -2.5  101.0  97.8
1991  5.0  15.2  6.5  -1.4  102.0  100.2
IS92  4.8  15.5  7.1  -0.1  103.0  102.1
1993  4.7  16.0  7.0  -1.0  104.1  104.0
1994  4.3  16.5  7.4  -1.2  105.1  105.8
1995  4.5  16.7  6.4  -1.5  106.2  107.7
;lotes: a - GDP Deflator
b - As percentage  of  GDP
c - Defi-it  of the  non-f  inancial  public  sector,  as percentage  of GDP
d - Increase  means  depreciation
e  - In terms  of the  consumption  deflator
f  - Actual  values66
Figure  5





Simulation  results  1990-95: 01  Shock
Real  GDP  Inflation  Curr.  Account  Nfps  Real  Exch.  Real
Year  Growth  Rates  Deficitb  Deficit'  Rated  Wage
1989'  10.0  13.3  3.0  -2.9  100.0  100.0
1990  2.9  33.7  5.8  -2.1  97.9  96.1
1991  4.8  18.1  6.7  -1.3  96.5  97.2
1992  4.5  15.9  6.9  -1.2  97.9  98.8
1993  4.3  16.5  6.6  -1.5  99.2  100.4
1994  3.9  16.9  6.9  -1.7  100.6  102.1
1995  4.1  17.0  6.0  -1.9  101.9  103-8
Notes:  a - GDP  Deflator
b - As percentage  of GDP
c  - Deficit  of the  non-financial  public  sector,  as percentage  of GDP
d  - Increase  means  depreciation
e - In terms  of the  consumption  deflator
f  - Actual  values6,R
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